兰德智库第五章 中国军队之美中系统性战争准备
第五章 人民解放军如何为美中系统性战争做准备
CHAPTER FIVE
我们有理由相信，北京是在万般无奈的情况下扣动扳机——在中国领导人以和平方式解决和美国的棘手分歧失败之后（当前的美中局势确如报告中所言、局势正在恶化与紧张——译者注）。
How the People’s Liberation Army Might Prepare for a Systemic U.S.-China War
人民解放军如何为美中系统性战争做准备
The previous chapters reviewed key trends that could shape the operational environment in which a hypothetical conflict under conditions of Chinese near global primacy might unfold. They also examined historic patterns to help illuminate how U.S.-China rivalry might esca-late to the point of conflict and what general form that conflict could take. We draw from these data for the scenario analysis in this chapter and in Chapters Six and Seven.
在本报告前几章，我们假设了中国达到准全球主导地位时可能出现冲突之各种情形，此外还研究了历史上霸权大国与崛起大国之争斗模式，从而阐述美中从竞争到冲突的可能性以及爆发争端的一般模式。因此，在接下来在本章以及第六章和第七章的美中冲突情景分析中还要引用上述篇章中的相关数据。
In this chapter we explore potential developments in China’s military and how it might position itself for a major U.S.-China conflict. To be sure, the PLA has long considered war with the United States in its planning and preparations for contingencies related to Taiwan and other disputed territories. However, Chinese experts have generally bound their analysis to hypothetical clashes involving such flash points as Taiwan. As was noted in Chapter One, PLA experts acknowledge the possibility of a great power war with the United States but have not provided any publicly available in depth analysis of systemic, major war. Above all, the judgment by civil authorities that U.S-China war is improbable constrains military leaders from undertaking large-scale preparations for such a war.
本章将探讨中国军队潜在发展情况以及如何为美中重大冲突做准备，可以肯定的是：中国军方在台湾与其他领土争议有关的突发事件爆发中，对可能的与美国发生战争的考虑、早已成竹在胸。然而，中国专家的分析通常只限于涉及台湾等热点的预测冲突。正如本报告第一章所指出的，军方专家坦承美中爆发大国战争之可能，但却没有发布任何公开对系统性、重大战争之深入分析。最重要的是，中国民政部门关于美中战争打不起来的判断，限制了中国军事领导人进行大规模应战准备。
We reserve analysis of how the PLA might fight a systemic U.S.-China war to Chapters Six and Seven. In this chapter we focus on how Chinese leaders and the PLA might prepare for a war with the United States that they have judged to be inevitable. Such a change in political stance and military posture would not happen overnight, of course. A key assumption of this chapter, expanded on in more detail in the subsequent chapters, is that U.S.-China conflict would be preceded by years of worsening tensions and deepening animosity. Given the well-known risks, China’s decision to go to war with the United States would be a tremendously significant choice. It is reasonable to expect that Beijing would come to this conclusion after considerable trepidation and only after Chinese leaders had concluded that peaceful ways of resolving intractable differences with the United States had failed. This period of inter-national struggle—which could last many years—could both coalesce Chinese thinking on the inevitability of war and grant the PLA some time to prepare. However, even with years of warning, China would not be able to design a military out of whole cloth. Rather, the PLA would have to prepare with the military it had largely built or planned to build. Assessed trends in the PLA’s anticipated future development thus provide a valuable baseline for estimating how China might position itself for a broader war with the United States. The anticipated state of the PLA would both open and constrain options for waging war. While a full review of how the PLA could posture for war lies beyond the scope of this report, we briefly explore in this chapter how China could modify its plans for power projection capa-bilities, overseas military access, military doctrine, and other features relevant to better posi-tioning itself for systemic conflict with the United States.
对解放军如何打一场系统的美中战争的分析，我们保留到第六章和第七章讨论，本章重点讨论中国领导人和解放军怎样为不可避免的美中战争进行准备。当然，政治立场和军事态势的变化不会在一夜之间发生——本章的关键假设是，美中冲突之前会有多年恶化的紧张局势和敌意加深，这一点在后面的章节中会有更详细的阐述。鉴于众所周知的风险，中国决定与美国开战将是一个极其重要的抉择——我们有理由相信，北京是在万般无奈的情况下扣动扳机——在中国领导人以和平方式解决和美国的棘手分歧失败之后（当前的美中局势确如报告中所言、局势正在恶化与紧张——译者注）。
在美中开战之前这段预计持续多年的纷争时期，中国既可以对战争的不可避免性进行相关思考，解放军也同时获得一些时间来准备应对即将到来的战争。然而，即使笼罩于多年的战争风险，中国也不可能凭空陡生军力另创新军。相反，中国人民解放军在很大程度上不得不利用既有或计划建立的军队进行准备。因此，对中国军力未来发展趋势的评估，为预测中国怎么与美国进行大规模战争提供了宝贵的研判信息。对中国人民解放军可能发动或放弃战争的选择预判虽然超出了本报告的范围，但我们还是在本章中简要探讨中国如何改善力量投射水平、海外军事介入和军事学说以及其他跟美国的系统性冲突有关的计划。
Context: The China Dream as the National Strategic Goal
背景： 作为国家战略目标的中国梦
Before analyzing developments in the military, we briefly review how the national strategy that the PLA serves might change in the lead-up to war. As is well known, China’s leadership has outlined a national strategy to achieve a desired end state by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. The vision of the so-called China Dream entails national revival and the realization of a high living standard for the nation’s citizens under CCP rule. Drawing from the analysis in a preceding study, we posit that Beijing seeks to become the preeminent global power. However, we also note that China seeks a form of pri-macy that would bear little resemblance to the form exercised by such previous global leaders as the United Kingdom and the United States. Exercising a partial global hegemony centered principally on Africa and Eurasia, Chinese international leadership would be characterized by a reliance on finance, diplomatic engagement, and security assistance to exercise influence while maintaining a modest overseas military presence. It would seek to build cooperative, stable ties with rival great powers, such as the European Union, India, and Japan, and to develop relations with Russia as its closest great power partner. In the Indo-Pacific region China would seek to become the undisputed preeminent power. In the developing world, China would focus on becoming the preferred partner and patron for client states through much of Africa, Eurasia, and the Middle East, as well as parts of the Caribbean and Latin America.
在分析军队的发展情况之前，我们先简要回顾一下解放军所服务的国家战略在战争爆发前会发生什么变化。众所周知，中国领导层已经制定了一项国家战略，在2049年中华人民共和国成立一百周年之际实现理想的最终状态。所称"中国梦 "的愿景是在中国共产党领导下实现民族复兴和国民高生活水平。根据前面的研究分析，我们认为中国政府寻求成为卓越的全球大国。然而，我们也注意到，中国寻求与英国和美国等以前的全球领袖所行使的特权形式没有什么相似之处。中国的国际领导力主要以非洲和欧亚大陆为中心行使部分全球霸权，特点是依靠金融、外交接触和安全援助来施加影响，同时保持适度的海外军事存在。中国将寻求与竞争对手的大国，如欧盟、印度和日本建立合作、稳定的关系，并与作为其最亲密大国伙伴的俄罗斯发展关系。在印度——太平洋地区，中国将寻求成为无可争议的卓越大国。在发展中世界，中国将专注于成为非洲、欧亚大陆和中东大部分地区以及加勒比和拉丁美洲部分地区的客户国家的首选合作伙伴和赞助者。
In a situation featuring a looming U.S.- China war, Chinese rulers would likely maintain the focus on achieving the China Dream as a key source of legitimacy and retain the ambition for an international end state featuring Chinese global primacy. The most important changes would concern Beijing’s willingness to adopt violent means to achieve its ends. This decision would probably not be made lightly and might be preceded by a period of intense interstate coercion that would fall short of overt hostilities. The decision could also be made in response to U.S. actions that closed off paths for Beijing to achieve its goals peacefully. China could step up its use of brinkmanship tactics, violence through gray zone platforms, and secretive special operations to intimidate recalcitrant enemies and weaken U.S. alliances and partner-ships. When such tactics proved insufficient, Chinese leaders might gradually accept the idea that war with the United States had become unavoidable.
在美中战争趋势隐约可见的情况下，中国领导人可能会继续把实现 "中国梦 "作为要务，并继续雄心勃勃地追求中国的全球优势，但最重要的问题在于中国是否采取军事手段来实现目标。不过，相信中国不会轻易付诸暴力手段，在这之前可能会发生激烈的国家间博弈，但不会是公开的敌对行动。中国付诸军事的决定可能是因为美国阻止北京和平崛起的无奈选择。为此，中国可以加强使用边缘政策战术，通过灰色地带平台的暴力，以及秘密的特别行动来恐吓顽固的敌人，削弱美国的联盟和合作伙伴关系。当这些措施最后都无法确保中国和平崛起后，中国领导人可能会明白跟美国的战争已经不可避免。
Military Developments: Preparations for a U.S.-China Systemic War
军事发展： 为美中系统性战争做准备
In this section we explore key developments related to the PLA in coming decades that could be modified in anticipation of a broader war with the United States. China’s ability to design a military to fight the United States is constrained, of course, by the reality of its past military modernization decisions. Even with years of warning, the PLA faces hard limits in its ability to significantly revamp its military. Thus, we assume that the PLA begins either of the war scenarios that are outlined in Chapters Six and Seven with a force that largely resembles the peacetime projections of future force developments. Accordingly, in this section we briefly review the PLA’s current modernization goals, missions, overseas footprint, doctrine, and force structure. We explore how some aspects of the modernization effort could be modified in anticipation of a looming conflict with the United States and analyze the ways in which the current force build could constrain and influence how the PLA operates once war begins.
在本节中，我们探讨未来几十年中国军力发展态势——它的发展轨迹可能因为或许到来的美中系统性战争而调整改变。当然，中国既往军事现代化建设决策理念对今天规划跟美国的反遏制战争依然尚存约束。即使有多年预警，解放军在大幅提升作战能力方面也遭遇严格限制。因此，我们假设解放军在本报告第六章和第七章描述的任何一种战争情景中的部队表现，与战前和平时期对未来态势预测基本相似。所以，在本节中我们简要回顾解放军目前的现代化目标、任务、海外足迹、作战理念和军力结构。我们探讨了中国军方在美中冲突趋势隐约可见的前提下，如何调整军事现代化发展的相关举措，并分析一旦战事爆发，目前的国防建设存在哪些制约和影响作战效能的因素（翻译到这里感觉美国南德智库不是在帮美国军方提出参考意见，而是在帮中国军队献计献策…… 哈哈哈哈——译者）。
Modernization Goals
现代化的目标
As part of its pursuit of international primacy, the PLA continues to aspire to become a world-class military by the end of 2049. Chinese leaders have not overtly stated what the phrase world-class military means to them, but the objectives discussed in official Chinese military documents and PLA literature suggest an ambition to build a PLA that is more operation-ally capable of prosecuting joint, high-tech wars fought primarily in the maritime and aero-space domains, that operates more efficiently as an institution, and that is more tightly tied to the CCP. While a full accounting of Chinese military capabilities is beyond the scope of this report, it should be noted that the PLA has made improvements in many of these areas, including structural reforms, the fielding of modern indigenous systems, and the strengthen-ing of its ability to conduct joint operations. PLA awareness of a looming conflict could affect China’s modernization ambitions in several ways. First, China might have to curtail some modernization efforts to adequately fund war preparations. For example, goals of building large inventories of prestigious but hugely expensive, technologically advanced ships and aircraft might have to be modified, to pay for dramatically expanded inventories of more mundane but more useful items such as PGMs. Second, Beijing’s eagerness to demonstrate its superiority to Washington could para-doxically incentivize it to continue building some high-end, technologically advanced plat-forms despite the pressure to curb such investments to fund war preparations. The principal reason for fielding such advanced weaponry would be political. Similarly, Beijing’s desire to showcase its world-class military could incentivize it to continue researching and devel-oping advanced weaponry. It could also induce extreme caution in the employment of the highest-profile assets such as stealth fighter aircraft and capital ships. China’s history, espe-cially in the late Qing era, provides examples in which Chinese authorities suffered major political humiliation when costly foreign-acquired military platforms failed miserably on the battlefield. Awareness of this legacy, CCP sensitivity to nationalist outcry, and aware-ness of the PLA’s inexperience could provide additional incentives for China to favor low-intensity, indirect, and lower- cost means of waging war against U.S.-backed forces while preserving its most advanced capabilities as political showpieces that take part mainly in lower-risk operations. Similarly, the desire to demonstrate the superiority of China’s mili-tary could incentivize PLA leaders to prioritize the destruction of politically potent symbols of U.S. military power and prowess, even if such attacks lacked sound military logic. Chi-nese commanders might prioritize risky efforts, for example, to locate and destroy U.S. air-craft carriers that are marginally involved in some remote clash between Chinese- and U.S.-backed forces.
作为追求国际首要地位的一部分，解放军继续渴望在2049年底前成为世界一流军队。中国领导人没有公开说明世界一流军队对他们意味着什么，但中国官方军事文件和解放军文献中讨论的目标表明，中国人民解放军富有雄心壮志地打造基于海洋和太空领域的高科技联合作战能力，而所有这一切都跟中国共产党的正确领导密切相关。虽然对中国军事能力的全面描述超出了本报告的范围，但应该指出的是，中国人民解放军已经在许多方面取得了进步，包括结构改革、现代本土实战系统的投入使用以及联合作战能力的提升。迫在眉睫地冲突来临可能在多个方面影响中国的现代化进程。首先，中国可能不得不削减一些现代化投资，以便为即将到的战争准备充足的资金。例如，大规模制造造价昂贵、技术先进的舰艇和飞机之计划可能不得不修改，以大幅投入增产性价比更高的如精确制导武器。其次，北京必须要向华盛顿展示自己的防卫优势，这可能会在某种程度上加大建造高端技术先进平台的投入，尽管这种投资与投入战争准备相矛盾（这里的论述事实上自相矛盾、高端平台的建造也是战争准备的内容——译者注）。装备这些先进武器的动机主要是政治原因。同样，北京希望展示其世界一流的军队，这可能会继续配套研究和开发先进的武器装备。这也促使中国在使用隐形战机和大型战舰等最引人注目的装备时极为谨慎。中国的历史、特别是晚清历史，提供了这样的例子：当清军依仗购买的昂贵外国军事装备在战场上还是惨遭失败后，中国当局遭受了重大的政治羞辱。有鉴于此，对民族主义呼声的敏感性、以及对解放军缺乏经验的认识，都会促使中国倾向于以低强度、间接和低成本的方式对美国支持的军队发动战争（事实上应该是中国应对美国挑起的战争——译者注），同时把最先进的武器装备作为参与低风险行动的主要政治展示品。同样，显示中国军威的愿望也会促使中国军方优先摧毁美国军事力量和实力的政治象征，即使这种攻击缺乏合理的军事逻辑（个人觉得这是报告作者主观臆断、中国不会首先发动战争——译者注）。例如，中国指挥官可能会优先考虑冒险尝试找到并摧毁美国航空母舰（这个似乎有可能、2023年6月20日，中国空军海军航空兵轰炸机部队轰六战机在南海对美军航母里根号编队进行低空突防模拟攻击。轰六采取”超低空奔袭，避过雷达，突破航母战斗群电子防御，直接出现在尼米兹级“里根号”的头顶，而美国航母居然没有任何发现，然后轰六对其火控照射，逼迫其90°大拐弯，机动躲避攻击，估计“里根号”全舰人员回去后都会看心理医生，毕竟这样大的轰炸机居然能没有任何轨迹的出现，着实吓人！——如若战时，我军轰炸机采用此招就可令美军防不胜防一举击沉美军航母——译者注），尽管这些航空母舰几乎没有参与一些遥远地域的中国和美国支持的军事力量之间的冲突。
People’s Liberation Army Missions
人民解放军的使命
In this section we examine how the PLA’s mission set could change in the years leading up to a potential U.S.-China systemic war. Chapters Six and Seven examine how Chinese leaders might modify the military’s missions and priorities once authorities direct the start of war. In the period of transition from peacetime to wartime, a top priority for the PLA would be to deepen its overall combat preparations. It could also seek to expand its overseas access and options for deploying military forces abroad to better protect vital vulnerable interests. The expansion of China’s economic interests has been one of the primary drivers of the development of Chinese expeditionary capabilities, and these remain a major vulnerability. Since the early 2000s the Chinese military has accordingly taken a more active role in opera-tions abroad to protect the nation’s interests and shape the international environment, pri-marily through nonwar missions and especially in BRI regions. Chinese leaders have also called on the military to support the government’s efforts to reorganize the international order. A 2019 defense report noted, for example, that the PLA intends to “actively participate in the reform of the global security governance system.” PAP and PLA deployments to BRI countries in Africa, Central Asia, and South Asia have helped Beijing’s efforts to protect its citizens and assets in those regions and shape a favorable security environment, all of which has generally proven popular with domestic audiences. In the lead-up to conflict between China and the United States, Beijing could uphold the same mission set but add new points of emphasis. While relying on nonviolent means to weaken U.S. influence, the PLA’s role in partnership building could expand. Given the PLA’s limited ability to convey combat forces safely, Beijing would have a strong incentive to try to motivate client militaries to step up their own self-defensive preparations—perhaps with generous Chinese support—and provide PLA experts who could help the client militaries use weaponry effectively. In the prewar period, the Chinese military could also see a loosening of restrictions on its use of force to protect overseas citizens and assets.
本节我们研究有可能爆发的美中系统性战争前几年，解放军作战准备的态势变化。接下来的第六章和第七章探讨一旦当局指示开战、预估中国领导人怎样部署军力和战时运作。在临战时期，解放军第一要务是全面深化战前准备工作，与此同时，军方还寻求扩大海外影响力以及选择海外部署军队，这样更好地加强对重要而脆弱目标的保护。中国经济利益的扩大是中国远征能力发展的主要驱动力之一，而且这些能力仍然是一个主要的弱点。自2000年代初以来，中国军队在海外行动中发挥了更积极的作用，以保护国家利益和塑造国际环境，主要是通过非战争任务，特别是在金砖国家地区。中国领导人还呼吁军队支持政府重组国际秩序的努力。例如，2019年的一份中国国防报告指出，解放军打算 "积极参与全球安全治理体系的改革。"武警和解放军在非洲、中亚和南亚金砖国家的部署，有助于中国保护这些地区公民和资产，并塑造有利的安全环境，为此，所有相关举措都普遍受到国内民众支持。在中美冲突之前，中国政府将会坚持同样的任务，但会增加新的重点。在依靠非暴力手段削弱美国影响力的同时，解放军在建立伙伴关系方面的作用可能扩大。鉴于解放军安全运送作战部队的能力有限，中国政府将积极鼓励客户军队加强自卫准备——也许是在中国的慷慨支持下——并提供解放军专家帮助客户军队有效使用武器。在战前阶段，中国军队在使用武力保护海外公民和资产方面的限制也会有所松动。
Authorities could allow PLA forces to engage hostile forces judged to be supported by the United States, though they might impose tight controls on attacks against U.S. troops. Another important addition to the military’s mission set could concern military action to protect the sovereignty, territory, or political stability of client regimes as a condition for military access or other forms of sup-port. Beijing’s assumption of some level of responsibility for the security of client states would likely open new points of contention and friction with the United States and set the stage for a dramatic expansion of potential battlefields once war began.
中国政府可能允许解放军与美国支持的敌对势力交战——尽管可能会严格控制对美国军队的攻击。中国军队的另一项重要任务是采取军事行动保护客户政权的主权、领土或政治稳定，以此作为军事准入或其他形式支持的条件。中国对客户国的安全承担某种程度的责任可能会引发与美国新的争论和摩擦，并为战争开始后潜在战场的急剧扩大埋下伏笔。
The People’s Liberation Army’s Footprint Abroad: Posturing for War
中国人民解放军的海外足迹： 为战争作准备
Beijing is today laying the groundwork for an expanded presence beyond its periphery to address threats and challenges to its global interests. China has employed a range of strate-gies, including increased PLA deployments in peacekeeping and the maritime domain, exten-sive security assistance and military training programs with countries friendly to China, and military intelligence cooperation. Beijing has also negotiated security frameworks with local governments in countries that house Chinese citizens and investments to improve its capacity to maintain order in case of domestic instability or crisis. In this section we examine the general trajectory of these efforts and consider how the PLA might use this footprint to prepare for combat operations against U.S. forces.
如今，中国正在为扩大其在周边地区的存在奠定基础，以应对其全球利益所面临的威胁和挑战。中国采取了一系列策略，包括增加解放军在维和和海洋领域的部署，与对中国友好的国家开展广泛的安全援助和军事训练项目，以及军事情报合作。中国还与中国公民和投资所在国的地方政府谈判安全框架，以提高其在国内不稳定或危机情况下维持秩序的能力。在本节中，我们将研究这些努力的总体轨迹，并考虑解放军如何利用这些有利条件来准备针对美国军队的作战行动。
China currently has a small military presence overseas consisting primarily of peacekeep-ing troops in Africa, border patrol forces in Central and South Asia（这里的表述有误：我国在中亚和南亚与毗邻国家的边境巡逻部队怎么属于“海外军事存在”？——译者注）, one base in Djibouti, and maritime deployments for counterpiracy and other operations. The PLA has steadily increased deployments of these forces through the 2020s, particularly in the maritime domain and in border areas. The central role of naval power in China’s military strategy has become increasingly apparent since 2009 and will be a key element in future PLA efforts to support Chinese primacy, a point acknowledged in official defense reports.
目前，中国在海外的军事存在规模不大，主要包括在非洲的维和部队，在中亚和南亚的边境巡逻部队，在吉布提的一个基地，以及海上部署的反海盗和其他行动。中国人民解放军在2020年之前一直在稳步增加这些部队的部署，特别是在海洋领域和边境地区。自2009年以来，海军力量在中国军事战略中的核心作用越来越明显，并将成为解放军未来支持中国首要地位的关键因素，这一点在官方国防报告中得到了承认。
China is considering additional bases. The PLA has reportedly discussed establishing logistics facilities in Angola, Indonesia, Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Seychelles, Singapore, SriLanka, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, and United Arab Emirates. Furthermore, the PLA has worked with civilian authorities to establish a global military logistics network, which is critical to an expanded military footprint abroad.
中国正在考虑建立更多的基地。据报道，中国人民解放军曾讨论过在安哥拉、印度尼西亚、肯尼亚、缅甸、巴基斯坦、塞舌尔、新加坡、斯里兰卡、塔吉克斯坦、坦桑尼亚、泰国和阿拉伯联合酋长国建立后勤设施。此外，中国人民解放军还与民政部门合作建立了全球军事后勤网络，这对扩大海外军事存在至关重要。
Aside from force deployments, Beijing has worked to align the security interests of BRI countries with China’s own interests through the creation of security dialogues and frame-works for security cooperation, which in turn provide a foundation for future military coop-eration and expanded PLA presence. Examples include China’s efforts to protect BRI projects through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which has focused on counter-terrorism efforts and protection of oil and gas pipelines in Central Asia. The Quadren-nial Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism, established in 2016, includes Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and Tajikistan and provides a forum for military and security cooperation among its members. It also functions as the primary security dialogue between Afghanistan and China.
除了部队部署，中国还通过建立安全对话和安全合作框架，努力使一带一路国家的安全利益与中国自身利益保持一致，而这又为未来的军事合作和扩大解放军的存在提供了基础。例如，中国通过上海合作组织努力保护一带一路项目，该组织的重点是反恐工作和保护中亚的石油和天然气管道。四方合作与协调机制成立于2016年，包括阿富汗、中国、巴基斯坦和塔吉克斯坦，为其成员之间的军事和安全合作提供一个论坛。它还作为阿富汗和中国之间的主要安全对话发挥作用。
A larger overseas PLA presence requires more access to facilities that can support opera-tions and stage forward-deployed forces. Figure 5.1 depicts unconfirmed candidate loca-tions for Chinese facilities that could host visiting military platforms outside China. Drawn from unclassified articles and databases, the map shows military facilities on contested arti-ficial islands in the South China Sea and the single overseas military base in Djibouti. The map illustrates the breadth of China’s investments in areas that could potentially support PLA military operations beyond the region, to include Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia (shaded red). The white dots on the map signify largely commercial port structures and facilities that feature a significant amount of Chinese investment. China is unlikely to turn many of the commercial port structures into support facilities for the PLA, but Chi-nese contractor or government personnel who have gained a degree of control over relevant facilities could be directed to carry out logistics support to visiting PLA platforms in some locations.
解放军更大的海外存在需要有更多的设施来支持行动并为前沿部署的部队提供舞台。图5.1描述了未被证实的中国设施的候选地点，这些设施可以容纳中国以外的访问军事平台。该图取自非机密文章和数据库，显示了南海有争议的人工岛上的军事设施和吉布提的单一海外军事基地。该地图说明了中国在可能支持解放军军事行动的地
区的投资范围，包括非洲、中东和南亚（红色阴影）。地图上的白点主要是指有大量中国投资的商业港口结构和设施。中国不太可能将许多商业港口结构变成解放军的支持设施，但对相关设施有一定控制权的中国承包商或政府人员可以被指示在一些地方为来访的解放军平台提供后勤支持。
FIGURE 5.1Map of Unconfirmed Candidate Locations for People’s Liberation Army Logistics Facilities Abroad and Ports with Chinese Investment.
图5.1 下图为尚未证实的中国军方海外后勤设施和中国投资港口的候选地点。
China’s limited success to date in expanding port and logistics access imposes serious con-straints on any PLA ambition to plan combat operations against U.S.-backed forces at distant locations. China lacks military bases capable of sustaining major combat operations, and it is far from clear that Beijing will succeed in developing such access. A major selling point of Chi-nese solicitation for access is precisely its rejection of Western “imperial” methods of military occupation and control. Even if China succeeds in gaining a more robust military base in some locations, such arrangements may remain relatively rare. While this constraint may be tolerable in a peacetime competition in which China’s principal overseas threats stem from nontradi-tional sources, it is likely to severely affect the PLA’s ability to conduct major combat operations against a peer military such as that of the United States, especially beyond the first island chain.
迄今为止，中国在扩大港口和物流通道方面取得的成功有限，这对解放军计划在远方对美国支持的部队采取作战行动的野心造成了严重的制约。中国缺乏能够维持重大作战行动的军事基地，而且还不清楚北京是否能成功开发这种通道。中国争取进入的一个主要卖点正是反对西方 "帝国式 "的军事占领和控制方法。即使中国成功地在某些地方获得了更强大的军事基地，这样的安排可能仍然相对罕见。在和平时期的竞争中，中国的主要海外威胁来自非传统来源，这种限制可能是可以容忍的，但它可能会严重影响解放军对美国这样的同行军队进行重大作战行动的能力，尤其是在第一岛链之外。
One way China could mitigate the lack of military bases abroad would be to off-load as much of the defensive needs for military support facilities as possible to client militaries. Arming and equipping host nations with anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities such as surface-to -air missiles, antiship missiles, and other weapon systems could help to serve the client state’s defensive needs and provide some measure of protection for Chinese interests and support facilities. PLA advisers and technicians could serve a critical role in advising on the use of the weapons or even operating them themselves. Clients that balked at exposing themselves to U.S. military attack might demand a greater PLA presence for protection. The degree of alignment between China and particular client states could affect how much mili-tary capability the states might be willing to operate on China’s behalf.
中国缓解海外军事基地不足的方法之一是尽可能多地将军事支持设施的防御需求转移给客户军队。为东道国装备反介入/区域封锁（A2/AD）能力，如地对空导弹、反舰导弹和其他武器系统，有助于满足客户国的防御需求，并为中国的利益和支持设施提供一定程度的保护（A2/AD武器，是美国五角大楼造的新词、指代中国武器，A2/AD武器包括先进潜艇、地对空导弹、反卫星武器以及计算机网络战武器和技术——译者注）。中国人民解放军的顾问和技术人员可以在为使用这些武器提供建议方面发挥关键作用，甚至可以亲自操作这些武器。那些不愿意将自己暴露在美国军事攻击之下的客户可能会要求解放军加强保护。中国与特定客户国之间的结盟程度可能会影响这些国家愿意为中国提供多少军事能力。
Another way China might seek to mitigate the vulnerability of military assets abroad could be to disguise shipments and movements as civilian in nature—that is, through the use of defense contractors or civilian transport ships. This fiction could ease the political difficulty of moving and operating combat forces into client states and perhaps help obscure the movement of Chinese military forces. Both of these approaches would lend themselves well to China’s leadership, which relies on CCP control of both civilian and military assets in support of each other. They have the drawback, however, of leaving transiting military assets extremely vulnerable, since civilian vessels are largely defenseless. To deter attacks, such ships might also carry vulnerable civilian passengers as a “human shield.” A similar tactic would be to collocate military support ports and facilities in densely urban areas.
中国可能试图减轻海外军事资产脆弱性的另一种方式是将货物和行动伪装成民用性质——即通过使用国防承包商或民用运输船。这种虚构的做法可以减轻将作战部队运入客户国并开展行动的政治困难，也许还有助于掩盖中国军队的行动。这两种方法都很适合中国的领导层，因为中国的领导层依赖于对民用和军用资产的领导，相互支持。然而，它们的缺点是使过境的军事资产极为脆弱，因为民用船只基本上没有防御能力。为了阻止攻击，这些船只还可以搭载脆弱的平民乘客作为 "人盾"。一个类似的策略是将军事支援港口和设施集中在密集的城市地区。
A third way to improve security for distant Chinese interests and protect transiting forces might be to attack the access points that could enable U.S. forces to threaten Chinese forces in wartime. In the period between peacetime and wartime, the PLA would not be authorized to directly attack U.S. facilities and access. However, China could encourage attacks by proxy forces to either directly threaten U.S. military facilities along the Maritime Silk Road or draw U.S. attention to other parts of the world, such as Europe or Latin America.
改善中国远方利益的安全和保护过境部队的第三种方法可能是：攻击能使美军在战时威胁到中国部队的通道口。在和平时期和战时之间，解放军将无权直接攻击美国的设施和通道。然而，中国可以鼓励代理人部队进行攻击，以直接威胁海上丝绸之路沿线的美国军事设施，或将美国的注意力吸引到世界其他地区，如欧洲或拉丁美洲。
Finally, the PLA could be directed in this period to step up preparations for overland transportation routes in recognition of the inevitable vulnerability of maritime routes. Chi-nese forces might step up SCO cooperation to protect overland pipelines with partner nations. Beijing might increase efforts to secure access agreements for transiting PLA forces through Russia, perhaps through the conclusion of some sort of alliance agreement. While it is dif-ficult to imagine today, Moscow’s incentive to side with Beijing could change in a situation featuring a widely anticipated showdown between China and the United States.
最后，由于认识到海上运输路线不可避免的脆弱性，解放军在这一时期可以加强对陆上运输路线的准备工作。中国军队可以加强上海合作组织的合作，以保护与伙伴国家的陆路管道。北京可能会加大努力，确保解放军部队通过俄罗斯时的准入协议，或许可以通过缔结某种联盟协议。虽然今天很难想象，但在中国和美国之间广泛预期的摊牌情况下，莫斯科站在北京一边的动机可能会发生变化。
Adapting Chinese Warfighting Concepts for a U.S.-China Systemic War
与时俱进应对美中系统性战争的中国作战理念
Chinese warfighting concepts have evolved to support military operations against tradi-tional and nontraditional threats, including those outside the region. While some concepts, such as Active Defense, have remained relatively consistent over the years, other plans—such as information dominance, “intelligentized” warfare, and the Three Warfares concept—illustrate how the PLA is thinking about future conflicts and incorporating trends in military technology and capabilities into its doctrine. This section outlines key Chinese warfighting concepts that are most likely to apply in the scenarios of extensive U.S.-China combat opera-tions analyzed in Chapters Six and Seven.
中国的作战理念一直在演变，以支持针对传统和非传统威胁的军事行动，包括区域外的威胁。虽然一些概念，如主动防御，多年来一直保持相对一致，但其他计划，如信息优势、"智能化 "战争和三个战区的概念，说明解放军正在思考未来的冲突，并将军事技术和能力的趋势纳入其理论。本节概述了中国的关键作战概念，这些概念最有可能适用于第六章和第七章所分析的美中大规模作战行动的情况。
Active Defense
积极防御
For decades, authoritative CCP documents and speeches have delineated Active Defense as the country’s military strategy. Active Defense has evolved since the 1980s to include a mix of offensive, defensive, and deterrent concepts at the operational and tactical levels. It can apply to China acting externally to defend its interests, encompassing operations farther from China’s periphery and operations in outer space and cyberspace. These principles have his-torically been reinterpreted and given new meaning as China’s situation has changed, and this would likely be the case if China approached a position of near primacy.
几十年来，中国共产党的权威文件和讲话都将积极防御作为国家的军事战略。自20世纪80年代以来，积极防御已经发展到包括作战和战术层面的进攻性、防御性和威慑性概念。它可以适用于中国为维护自身利益而采取的对外行动，包括远离中国周边地区的行动以及在外层空间和网络空间的行动。随着中国形势的变化，这些原则已经被重新解释并赋予了新的含义，如果中国到达准全球首要地位，情况可能也会如此。
Facing a looming systemic war with the United States, the PLA could adapt this set of guiding principles to authorize offensive operational concepts that target the militaries of the United States and its allies and partners. China has already shown considerable ambigu-ity in what it considers self- defense, having stated in defense reports that self-defense applies to distant interests, not just those of the Chinese homeland. In a showdown with the United States, the meaning could be expanded further to include the interests of key client states. The result could be a PLA that is more willing and able to aggressively attack perceived threats to the interests of China and its clients around the world.
面对与美国迫在眉睫的系统性战争，解放军可以调整这套指导原则，授权针对美国及其盟国和伙伴的军队的进攻性作战概念。中国在其认为的自卫方面已经表现出相当大的模糊性，在国防报告中表示，自卫适用于远方的利益，而不仅仅是中国本土的利益。在与美国的对决中，其含义可能会进一步扩大，包括关键客户国的利益。其结果可能是中国人民解放军更愿意也更有能力积极攻击对中国及其世界各地客户利益的威胁。
China’s Military Relationship with Client States
中国与客户国家的军事关系
China’s relationship with client states would play an important role in its preparations for a showdown with the United States and in the two conflict scenarios outlined in Chapters Six and Seven. But how and why might such a network of client states work? Why would they engage in fighting against the United States? How would such a network differ from the coali-tions of countries that supported U.S. power in past wars? A thorough analysis of the forms that a Chinese network of supportive military partnerships could take lies beyond the bounds of this report, but here we offer a few preliminary thoughts.
中国跟客户国的关系将在其与美国摊牌的准备工作中，以及在第六章和第七章所述的两种冲突情景中发挥重要作用。但是，这个客户国网络如何运作？他们为什么要参与反对美国的斗争？这个网络跟过去战争中支持美国力量的国家联盟有什么不同？对中国支持性军事伙伴关系网络可能采取的形式进行彻底分析超出了本报告的范围，但我们在此提出一些初步想法。
First, we reiterate that this study focuses on a hypothetical scenario that features a China nearing the point of global primacy. The China described in this study differs consider-ably from China today, which may be a large economy but is not considered a peer of the United States. A China that enjoyed relatively more wealth and power would become a more attractive patron for countries around the world, especially if—per the assumptions of this study—the United States experienced a substantial relative decline in its national power. Since the study also assumes that the international situation features considerably more fragmen-tation, disorder, and breakdown, a large number of countries, especially in the developing world, could experience considerable stress. The stresses could arise domestically, from inter-nal civil conflict, strife, or other competing centers of power. Rival states could step up feuds over territory, resources, or other issues. Various transnational threats might exacerbate the challenges faced by many developing countries. To help cope with these issues and achieve their own national goals, many of these countries could seek patronage and assistance from the two most wealthy and powerful countries, China and the United States.
首先，我们重申，本研究关注的是假设情景，即中国接近全球首要地位的情景。本研究中描述的中国与当前的中国有很大不同，中国可能是一个大型经济体，但不被认为是美国的同行。一个享有相对更多财富和权力的中国将成为对世界各国更有吸引力的靠山，特别是如果——根据本研究的假设——美国的国力出现大幅相对下降时。由于该研究还假设国际形势的特点是更多的分裂、混乱和崩溃，大量的国家，特别是发展中国家，可能会经历相当大的压力。这些压力可能出现在国内，来自国内的内部冲突、纷争或其他权力中心的竞争。敌对国家可能会加强对领土、资源或其他问题的争斗。各种跨国的威胁可能会加剧许多发展中国家所面临的挑战。为了帮助应对这些问题并实现自己的国家目标，许多国家可能会寻求中国和美国这两个最富裕和强大的国家的支持和援助。
The polarization of the international order as U.S.-China rivalry deepened would proba-bly result in a greater willingness on the part of Beijing and Washington to provide benefits in exchange for international support. U.S.-China competition for support could extend to rival actors between states or even within a country. In a situation evocative of the Cold War, the result could be a complex overlapping mixture of motivations on the part of different states and nonstate actors that seek to leverage outside help to achieve their own goals. Cooperation with China could be limited to immediate goals of concern for particular client states, such as the elimination of a domestic threat or defeat of a neighboring rival state. China might provide support if any of these threats appeared to be aligned with or backed by the United States. Such a situation would consist of many instances in which China and the United States exploited disorder and existing conflict for their own geopolitical purposes, a phenomenon that has occurred in many previous eras of systemic competition and great power conflict. In some cases, Chinese “coalitions” may consist primarily of China and the small number of countries involved that had the most at stake in the outcome of the relevant local feud, aug-mented by paramilitary forces or hired security contractors. A Chinese network could consist of small groupings of clients in different geographic regions, which did not interact much at all with one another but instead operated largely autonomously. Their only connection with other countries aligned with China might be Chinese patronage. In some cases, the client states might be willing to fight U.S. forces directly involved in con-flicts of immediate concern but be less inclined to fight U.S. forces outside their own immediate vicinity. This would not be a “coalition” so much as a loose-knit, poorly integrated collection of client states, paramilitary forces, and security contractors that either leveraged Chinese patron-age for their own purposes or did so in order to gain Chinese benefits.
随着美中竞争的加深，国际秩序的两极化很可能导致北京和华盛顿更愿意提供利益以换取国际支持。美中之间对支持的竞争可能会延伸到国家之间甚至国家内部的竞争者。在令人联想到冷战的情况下，结果可能是不同国家和非国家行为者的动机复杂地重叠在一起，他们寻求利用外部帮助来实现自己的目标。与中国的合作可能仅限于特定客户国关心的直接目标，如消除国内威胁或击败邻国的对手。如果这些威胁中的任何一个似乎与美国结盟或得到美国的支持，中国可能会提供支持。在这种情况下，中国和美国为了自己的地缘政治目的而利用混乱和现有的冲突——这种现象在以往许多系统性竞争和大国冲突的时代都曾发生过。在某些情况下，中国的 "联盟 "可能主要由中国和少数与相关地方争斗的结果关系最密切的国家组成，再加上准军事部队或雇佣的安全承包商。中国的网络可能由不同地理区域的小型客户组成，他们之间没有什么互动，而是基本上自主运作。他们与其他与中国结盟的国家的唯一联系可能是中国的赞助。在某些情况下，客户国可能愿意与直接参与眼前冲突的美国军队作战，但不太愿意与自己周边的美国军队作战。这不是一个 "联盟"，而是一个由客户国、准军事部队和安全承包商组成的松散的、整合度不高的集合体，它们或者为自己的目的而利用中国的赞助，或者为获得中国的利益而这样做。
The military capability of these groupings would vary but probably feature a low level of integration and, assuming these occurred primarily in developing countries, might feature a generally low level of train-ing and operational proficiency. Depending on their respective adversaries, however, Chinese military assistance could be sufficient to empower these actors to prevail against threats of similar or weaker capability and proficiency. To offset some of these weaknesses, highly skilled security contractors or paramilitary forces could play an especially important role.
Other forms of Chinese military partnerships are possible, however. Following the prec-edent of past rising great powers, a China enjoying the momentum of climbing closer to the point of global primacy might garner the support of a few countries eager to curry favor by pledging loyalty. If these countries judged that the United States appeared headed toward defeat, they might be willing to risk antagonizing Washington by sending military forces to support Chinese-led coalitions against U.S.-backed forces.
这些团体的军事能力各不相同，但可能具有较低的一体化水平，而且，假设这些团体主要发生在发展中国家，其训练和作战能力也可能普遍较低。然而，根据他们各自的对手，中国的军事援助可能足以使这些行为者在面对类似或较弱的能力和熟练度的威胁时获胜。为了抵消这些弱点，高技能的安全承包商或准军事部队可以发挥特别重要的作用。然而，其他形式的中国军事合作也是可能的。按照过去崛起的大国的先例，一个享受着向全球首要地位攀升的势头的中国可能会获得一些急于通过承诺忠诚来讨好的国家的支持。如果这些国家认为美国似乎正在走向失败，他们可能愿意冒着与华盛顿对立的风险，派遣军队支持中国领导的联盟对抗美国支持的部队。
This would be more like a tra-ditional coalition of military forces willing to fight outside their immediate border areas in support of a patron military, although perhaps also augmented by paramilitary forces and security contractors. But the limited power projection capabilities of many candidate BRI partner countries for China suggests the pool of such countries would be small. Alternatively, a broader number of supportive clients eager to demonstrate their loyalty to China might commit small numbers of highly specialized capabilities to augment PLA forces. China would probably have to provide much of the logistics capability to move and sustain such forces. In operations, these coalitions would depend heavily on China’s military, which would be expected to furnish the bulk of the combat power. The level of interoperability between China and the more capable of its coalition partners could vary considerably, from poorly integrated to some degree of interoperability with more capable and trusted allies. But the challenges of operating with such disparate countries would probably constrain the degree of interoperability to an even more severe degree than is experienced by the United States with its own allies. The willingness of these coalitions to risk clashes with U.S. forces would probably depend on the assessment of client states as to the prospects for Chinese victory and risks of escalation. If they judged the U.S. military to be seriously weakened and likely to be defeated, the motivation to join Chinese operations could be higher.
这更像是一个传统的军队联盟，愿意在其直接边界地区之外作战，以支持赞助国的军队，尽管可能还有准军事部队和安全承包商的支持。但许多候选的一带一路伙伴国对中国的力量投射能力有限，这表明能够支持中国的国家数量会很少。另一种情况是，更多的支持中国的客户渴望展示他们对中国的忠诚，他们可能会投入少量的高度专业化的能力来加强解放军的力量。中国可能需要提供大部分的后勤能力来运送和维持这些部队。在行动中，这些联盟将在很大程度上依赖于中国的军队，而中国将提供大部分的战斗力。中国和其联盟伙伴中能力较强的国家之间的互操作性水平可能会有很大的不同，从整合性差到与能力较强和值得信赖的盟友有某种程度的互操作性。但与这些不同的国家合作的挑战可能会限制互操作性的程度，甚至比美国与自己的盟友之间的互操作性更为严重。这些联盟是否愿意冒着与美国军队发生冲突的风险，可能取决于客户国对中国胜利的前景和升级的风险的评估。如果他们认为美军被严重削弱并可能被打败，那么加入中国行动的动机就会更高。
Information Dominance
信息主导地位
This Chinese military concept proposes that the side that dominates the information environ-ment is best positioned to prevail in battle. Chinese strategists have concluded that the surest path to escalation control and prevailing in conflict is through information dominance—with the broadest possible definition of the term information. To achieve information dominance, PLA writings emphasize detecting, identifying, and attacking enemy operational system net-works. By carrying out kinetic and nonkinetic strikes against leadership, command and con-trol, and information nodes, the Chinese believe they can “information isolate” an adversary and render it unable to function or make decisions. The idea that cyberoperations and infor-mation operations can be used in wartime to target civilian infrastructure and shape an adver-sary’s societal thinking has been written in authoritative PLA sources since at least 2009. If the time came when Chinese leaders had to weigh the decision to engage in war with the United States, the PLA would probably already be operating aggressively to nonkinetically disrupt U.S. command nodes as part of the peacetime struggle. Military cybersecurity units could carry out operations to access U.S. civilian infrastructure assets to build options for wartime; state and military actors could also direct Chinese commercial companies to turn over data and access they had created with customers in other countries. Intelligence collec-tion, reconnaissance, and surveillance of U.S. networks and combat dispositions could be a priority line of effort. In geographically distant client countries, PLA assets could be expected to prioritize the establishment of ISR to enable A2/AD systems.
中国的这一军事概念提出是因为主导信息环境的一方最有可能在战斗中获胜。中国的战略家们认为，控制冲突升级和取得胜利的最可靠途径是通过信息主导权——对信息一词的定义尽可能广泛。为了实现信息主导地位，解放军的著作强调探测、识别和攻击敌人的作战系统网络工程。通过对领导层、指挥和控制以及信息节点进行动能和非动能打击，中国人认为他们可以对对手进行 "信息隔离"，使其无法运作或做出决策。至少从2009年开始，解放军的权威资料中就有这样的观点：网络行动和信息行动可以在战时用来攻击民用基础设施并塑造对手的社会思维。
如果到了中国领导人不得不权衡与美国开战的决定时，解放军可能已经在积极行动，作为和平时期斗争的一部分，以非动态方式破坏美国的指挥节点。军事网络安全单位可以开展行动，进入美国民用基础设施资产，为战时建立选择；国家和军事行为者也可以指示中国商业公司交出他们与其他国家的客户建立的数据和访问。对美国网络和作战部署的情报收集、侦察和监视可能是一项优先工作。在地理上遥远的客户国家，解放军的资产可望优先建立情报，监视和侦察，以支持反介入/区域封锁的A2/AD系统。
Intelligentized Warfare
智能化战争
Chinese writings have recently started referring to “intelligentized” (智能化; zhinenghua) warfare, an emerging concept that suggests that future warfare will evolve from “system con-frontation” (as discussed in the information dominance concept above) to “algorithm con-frontation.” In intelligentized warfare, the side with the algorithm advantage dominates war with human-computer hybrid operations, and neural network decisionmaking, technologies and capabilities. The ability to engage in algorithm confrontation depends at least partly on China’s ability to master big data analytics, which Chinese researchers posit will better posi-tion China to win future military conflict between great powers. As one article notes, the proliferation of big data signals the arrival of a new form of warfare, with data offense and data defense at its core. The PLA’s anticipated evolution in the coming years could result in a military more comfortable with employing AI in its combat systems. How much the PLA might modify its concept of operations and activities to accord with AI-enhanced technologies would depend on how far along the PLA had progressed in its modernization efforts. Since such systems could require considerable technical expertise to manage and operate, it seems plausible that only a small portion of the PLA would be fully capable of fighting in accordance with its most advanced doctrines even decades from now. The rest of the PLA, by contrast, might continue to lag behind, with older doctrines and equipment, by a considerable margin. A two-tiered PLA, with a minority group of well-equipped and skilled units and a far larger group of less skilled and less competent forces, would in many ways reflect a tendency that has been present in the PLA for a long time.
中国的著作最近开始提及 "智能化"（zhinenghua）战争，这一新兴概念表明，未来的战争将从 "系统对抗"（如上文信息优势概念中所讨论的）演变为 "算法对抗"。在智能化战争中，拥有算法优势的一方通过人机混合行动、神经网络决策、技术和能力来主导战争。参与算法对抗的能力至少部分取决于中国掌握大数据分析的能力，中国研究人员认为这将使中国在未来大国之间的军事冲突中更有优势。正如一篇文章指出的那样，大数据的扩散预示着一种新的战争形式的到来，其核心是数据进攻和数据防御。解放军在未来几年的预期演变可能会导致军队更愿意在其作战系统中使用人工智能。解放军在多大程度上可以修改其行动概念和活动以适应人工智能增强的技术，将取决于解放军在其现代化努力中取得了多大进展。由于这些系统可能需要相当多的技术专长来管理和操作，似乎只有一小部分解放军能够完全按照其最先进的理论作战，甚至在几十年后也是如此。相比之下，解放军的其他部队可能会继续落后，他们的理论和装备都比较陈旧，差距很大。一个“两极分化”的解放军，由少数装备精良、技术过硬的部队组成，而由技术较差、能力较弱的部队组成的队伍要大得多，这在许多方面反映了解放军长期以来存在的一种倾向性。
The PLA took decades of modernization, for example, to build a handful of “informatized” units featuring integrated computer networks of weapons and platforms and digitized sen-sors. At the same time, much of the PLA continues to struggle with basic mechanization. Similarly, in a hypothetical scenario featuring growing momentum toward war, PLA leaders might maintain a small number of elite forces featuring the highest levels of “intelligentiza-tion,” but these would probably be based and operated on the mainland and on the wealthy, strategically vital coasts. Major warships and advanced aircraft could have such capabilities as well. However, PLA units deployed farther away and along the western frontiers might feature a far lower level of advanced technologies. This lack of complete integration could incentivize Chinese military leaders to promote a form of war featuring a high level of cen-tralized control and a heavy reliance on unmanned and automated systems. Long-range precision-guided missile strikes, attacks by unmanned platforms, and cyberoperations could be especially appealing to such a leadership.
例如，解放军经过几十年的现代化建设，建立了为数不多的 "信息化 "部队，其特点是武器和平台的综合计算机网络以及数字化的传感器。与此同时，解放军的大部分部队仍在为基本的机械化而努力。同样，在一个以战争势头不断增长为特征的假设情况下，解放军领导人可能会保留少量以最高水平的 "智能化 "为特征的精英部队，但这些部队可能会在大陆和富裕的、具有战略意义的海岸地区驻扎和行动。主要的军舰和先进的飞机也可能有这样的能力。然而，部署在更远的地方和西部边境的解放军部队的先进技术水平可能要低得多。这种缺乏完全整合的情况可能会激励中国军事领导人推动一种以高度集中控制和严重依赖无人驾驶和自动化系统为特点的战争形式。远程精确制导导弹攻击、无人平台攻击和网络行动对这样的领导层可能特别有吸引力。
The Three Warfares
三大战法
The Chinese concept of the Three Warfares illustrates the importance China places on seiz-ing the information initiative and continuously shaping the narrative in both peacetime and wartime. The Three Warfares comprise public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare. An overall focus of the Three Warfares is deterring or breaking an adversary’s will to fight and degrading decisionmaking, as well as mobilizing support and enthusiasm for the CCP’s agenda. The specific objectives of each “pillar” of the Three Warfares are to control public opinion, organize psychological offense and defense, engage in legal struggle, and fight for popular will and public opinion. Chinese scholars emphasize that in wartime, military campaign activities should be synchronized with Three Warfares public opinion, psychologi-cal, and legal activities to ensure consistency of the narrative presented to adversaries, part-ners, and the larger regional and international communities. In a situation featuring intense and hostile U.S.-China rivalry, the PLA could be expected to invest heavily in activities and operations associated with the Three Warfares. This would be another form of fighting without engaging in kinetic struggle, and it would be especially important for efforts to build military access and military partnerships. The activities would also remain essential to China’s efforts to weaken and undermine U.S. alliances and partner-ships. The task of building international support for China could become considerably easier in conditions featuring its near global primacy, as China would likely enjoy a higher level of international support and authority than it does today, especially among the BRI countries Beijing cares most about.
中国的 "三战 "概念说明了中国在和平时期和战争时期都非常重视掌握信息的主动权和不断塑造叙事。“三战 ”包括舆论战、心理战和法律战。“三战”的总体重点是威慑或摧毁对手的战斗意志，削弱决策，以及调动对中国议程的支持和热情。三战中每个 "支柱 "的具体目标是控制舆论、组织心理攻防、参与法律斗争、争取民众意愿和舆论。中国学者强调：在战时，军事战役活动应与三战的舆论、心理和法律活动同步进行，以确保向对手、伙伴以及更大的区域和国际社会展示的叙事一致性。在中美激烈敌对的情况下，可以预期解放军会对跟"三战 "相关的活动和行动中投入大量资金。这将是另一种形式的战斗，不需要参与动能斗争，而且对建立军事联系和军事伙伴关系的努力尤为重要。这些活动对于中国削弱和破坏美国联盟和合作伙伴关系的努力也仍然至关重要。在中国接近全球主导地位的情况下，建立对中国的国际支持任务会变得容易得多，因为中国可能会享有比现在更高的国际支持和权威，特别是在北京最关心的一带一路沿线国家中。
Chinese Warfighting Concepts, in Sum
中国总体作战概念
The four Chinese warfighting concepts discussed herein have evolved to include doctrine that will support Chinese military operations in future conflicts. While these concepts can be applied to regional conflicts, they also carry important implications for a potential U.S.-China war. This chapter has focused primarily on how China might modify and adapt these concepts in anticipation of a looming major U.S.-China conflict; subsequent chapters examine their application in wartime. Table 5.1 summarizes these warfighting concepts.
本文讨论的四个中国作战概念已经发展到包括支持中国在未来冲突中军事行动的理论。虽然这些概念可以应用于地区冲突，但它们对潜在的美中战争也有重要影响。本章主要关注的是中国如何在预期美中重大冲突的情况下修改和调整这些概念；随后的章节将研究它们在战时的应用。表5.1总结了这些作战概念（图表与内文内容重复故略——译者注）。
Potential Near-War Changes to People’s Liberation Army War Planning
人民解放军应对潜在战争的规划
China’s investment in military capabilities has shown impressive gains, and PLA scholars have outlined an ambitious vision for warfare. Yet, whether the Chinese military can realize the full potential of such capabilities remains unclear, especially in a major conflict with the United States. Here we draw on the preceding sections to suggest potential distinctive features of how China might prepare and fight against the United States in a near-peer systemic war to decide global primacy. These features include a heavy reliance on civilian assets and efforts to augment a limited power projection capability; a moralistic and politicized approach to war; an overemphasis on the prestige value of weapons and platforms; a two-tiered military with bifurcated combat capabilities; a preference for proxy, standoff, and indirect war methods; and loosely coordinated war efforts with coalition partner militaries.
中国在军事能力方面的投资已经显示出令人印象深刻的收益，解放军的学者们已经勾勒出一个雄心勃勃的战争愿景。然而，中国军队能否充分实现这些能力的潜力仍不清楚，尤其是在与美国的重大冲突中。在此，我们借鉴前文的内容，提出了中国在一场决定全球首要地位的近似系统性战争中，如何准备和对抗美国的潜在独特特征。这些特点包括：严重依赖民用资产和努力增强有限的力量投射能力；道德主义和政治化的战争方式；过度强调武器和平台的声望价值；具有“两级分化”作战能力的两级分化军队；倾向于代理、对峙和间接战争方法；以及与联盟伙伴军队松散地协调战争努力。
Heavy reliance on civilian assets. China has long emphasized cooperation between party-controlled civilian and military efforts as a key feature of its military thinking and opera-tions. The PLA under Xi, for example, has highlighted “civil-military fusion” as a key doc-trine for raising the technological competence of the military. The approach is facilitated by the reality of CCP penetration and control of civilian government, commercial entities, and military entities. If China were facing a potential systemic war with the United States, this principle would become even more appealing as a means of offsetting the PLA’s limited power projection capabilities. Outside China, in particular, the PLA may have little choice but to rely on civilian contractors to provide essential logistics services and support. Armed civil-ian contractors could carry out combat operations on behalf of, or alongside, uniformed PLA units. Civilian contractors could also be responsible for conveying troops and equipment and could help service ports and airfields that feature deployed or visiting PLA assets. One way to deter adversaries from targeting such vulnerable assets would be to use human shields—that is, to place vulnerable civilians in proximity. China could, for example, ship arms on vessels carrying large numbers of civilian passengers. Beijing would count on the potential outcry about killing civilians to discourage U.S. strikes, a stance that would accord well with its mor-alistic and highly politicized approach to war.
对民用资产的严重依赖。长期以来，中国一直强调党领导的民事和军事工作之间的合作是其军事思想和行动的主要特征。例如，习近平领导的解放军强调 "军民融合 "是提高军队技术能力的关键文件。中国共产党对文职政府、商业实体和军事实体的参与和领导的现实为这种做法提供了便利。如果中国面临与美国的潜在系统性战争，这一原则作为抵消解放军有限力量投射能力的手段将变得更加有吸引力。特别是在中国境外，解放军可能别无选择，只能依靠民间承包商来提供基本的后勤服务和支持。民间武装承包商可以代表解放军的军警部队或与他们一起开展作战行动。民间承包商还可以负责运送部队和设备，并可以帮助为解放军部署或访问的资产提供港口和机场服务。阻止对手攻击这些脆弱资产的方法之一是使用人盾，即把脆弱的平民置于附近。例如，中国可以在载有大量平民乘客的船上运送武器。中国将依靠对杀害平民的潜在呼声来阻止美国的打击，这一立场与中国的道德主义和高度政治化的战争方式十分吻合。
A moralistic and politicized approach to war. In past wars the Peoples’ Republic of China has tended to emphasize the ideological and political dimensions of war in part as a way to offset its disadvantages in materiel. China’s power projection capabilities will probably remain modest even if the nation grows closer to becoming a power peer of the United States, and this limitation could motivate Beijing to revive such long-standing practices. Doctrines such as the Three Warfares already indicate that an exaggerated emphasis on moral and political topics will be a likely feature of China’s approach to fighting. Moreover, a looming war with the United States to decide the issue of systemic leadership would add other power-ful incentives.
道德主义和政治化的战争方式。在过去的战争中，中华人民共和国倾向于强调战争的意识形态和政治层面，部分是为了抵消其在物质方面的劣势。即使中国越来越接近于成为美国的同级强国，中国的力量投射能力可能仍然不大，这种限制可能会促使中国政府恢复这种长期存在的做法。诸如 "三战 "等理论已经表明，对道德和政治话题的夸张强调将是中国作战方式的一个可能的特点。此外，与美国决定系统性领导权问题的战争迫在眉睫，这将增加其他有力的刺激。
China could hope to break the United States will to fight in part by delegiti-mizing the U.S. war effort and by undermining U.S. alliances and international support. It would also need to bolster its own standing among its partner nations and the international community as an aspirant for global leadership. What this might mean in practice is that the PLA relies heavily on coalitions of forces to lend an air of international legitimacy to its operations against U.S.-backed forces. China could also cultivate outrage by deliberately plac-ing civilians in harm’s way as any U.S. strikes on such a facility would incur large numbers of civilian casualties. Another way to cultivate moral outrage would be to rely on client militar-ies to do much of the fighting and bear the brunt of U.S. attacks.
中国希望通过授权美国的战争努力以及破坏美国的联盟和国际支持来打破美国的作战意愿。中国还需要提高自己在伙伴国和国际社会中的地位，使其成为全球领导地位的追求者。这在实践中可能意味着，解放军在很大程度上依靠部队联盟，为其针对美国支持的部队的行动提供国际合法性。中国还可以通过故意将平民置于危险境地来培养愤怒情绪，因为美国对此类设施的任何打击都会造成大量平民伤亡。培养道义上的愤怒的另一个方法是依靠客户军队来进行大部分的战斗，并在美国的攻击中首当其冲。
Overemphasis on the prestige value of weapons and platforms. China’s political and mor-alistic approach to war could be bolstered by Beijing’s determination to show its superiority over the United States, as demonstrated by the goal to build a “world-class military” by mid-century. In addition to their military value, the development of prestige weapons such as air-craft carriers and stealth fighters provides politically valuable messages that support Beijing’s political arguments. Facing a war with the United States, China could fear the political impli-cations of the loss of such expensive prestige weapons. As a result, it could husband and mini- mize the exposure of such systems to U.S. attack. Thus, the PLA might employ its advanced weapons in lower-risk combat operations that showcase its prowess without sacrificing the platforms. Conversely, the political value placed on prestige weapons could incentivize Bei-jing to prioritize the targeting and destruction of major platforms such as U.S. aircraft carri-ers, perhaps even to the detriment of more militarily sound targets.
过分强调武器和平台的威望价值。中国对战争的政治和道义上的态度可以得到支持，因为北京决心显示其对美国的优势，在本世纪中叶建立一支 "世界级军队 "的目标证明了这一点。除了军事价值外，发展航空母舰和隐形战斗机等威望武器还能提供有政治价值的信息，支持北京的政治论点。面对与美国的战争，中国可能会担心失去这些昂贵的声望武器所带来的政治影响。因此，中国可以将这些系统暴露在美国的攻击之下，并将其小型化。因此，解放军可以在风险较低的作战行动中使用其先进的武器，在不牺牲平台的情况下展示其实力。相反，威望武器的政治价值可能会激励北京优先攻击和摧毁美国航空母舰等主要平台，甚至可能损害军事上更合理的目标。
A two-tiered military with bifurcated combat capabilities. The exaggerated emphasis on demonstrating the PLA’s ability to field a superior military has historically led China to build a handful of well-equipped, elite units while much of the rest of the military lags behind with a lower level of modernization. For example, although the PLA has outlined ambitions to operate as a premier military capable of integrated joint operations, its ability to do so remains impaired by inadequate numbers of educated and skilled personnel, inexperience with distributed warfare, and political and cultural preferences for more centralized means of operating military forces. The problems of a bifurcated military are exacerbated by Chi-nese weaknesses in regulatory enforcement and an inconsistent rule of law. Central leaders have tried on several occasions to overhaul and improve the quality of regulatory enforce-ment and curb the power of local party bosses. However, progress has remained slow, owing principally to the lack of an independent judiciary and the unchecked power of the ruling CCP. The result has been uneven local compliance with central directives, spotty enforce-ment of regulations, and extensive corruption.
两级军队，作战能力两级分化。夸张地强调解放军有能力组建一支卓越的军队，这在历史上导致中国建立了少数装备精良的精英部队，而军队的其他部分则以较低的现代化水平落在后面。例如，尽管中国人民解放军已经提出了作为一支能够进行综合联合作战的一流军队的雄心壮志，但由于受过教育和有技能的人员数量不足，对分布式战争缺乏经验，以及政治和文化上对更集中的军事力量运作方式的偏好，其能力仍然受到影响。军队两级分化的问题由于中国在监管执法方面的弱点和法治建设局限而变得更加严重（关于这个论点作者实际上显得牵强附会、甚至风马牛不相及——译者注）。中央领导人曾多次试图整顿和提高监管执法的质量，并遏制地方政府的权力。然而，进展仍然缓慢，主要原因是司法机构的局限和政令不畅。其结果是地方对中央指令的遵守程度不一，法规的执行不力，以及广泛的腐败。
The two-tiered state of readiness and modernization could continue through the next few decades, with only a small share of forces experiencing the most dramatic gains by adopting AI and other advanced technologies while the rest of the military lags behind. Moreover, the desire to husband and protect the most prestigious forces could mean that the PLA relies on its less advanced forces to carry out combat operations. The result could further incentiv-ize China to rely on proxy forces and precision-guided missile or cyberattack standoffs, all of which could be employed without requiring an integrated joint force. PLA forces abroad might operate on a de facto bifurcated doctrine, with less prepared units operating according to outdated methods, as compared with more elite units based along China’s wealthy coastal provinces.
这种两级战备和现代化状态可能会持续到未来几十年，只有一小部分部队通过采用人工智能和其他先进技术获得了最显著的收益，而其他部队则落后。此外，对节俭和保护最负盛名的部队的渴望可能意味着解放军依靠其不太先进的部队来进行战斗行动。其结果可能会进一步激励中国依靠代理部队和精确制导导弹或网络攻击对峙，所有这些都可以在不需要综合联合部队的情况下使用。中国人民解放军驻外部队可能按照事实上的两分法运作，准备不足的部队按照过时的方法运作，相比之下，驻扎在中国富裕的沿海省份的部队更加精锐。
A preference for proxy, standoff, and indirect war methods. The combination of a moral-istic emphasis on the war, exaggerated emphasis on the prestige value of platforms, and the reality of a bifurcated military featuring a small elite set of units and uncertainty over the combat readiness of lower-tier units provide compelling incentives for China to avoid sym-metric direct engagements with U.S. joint forces in favor of asymmetric means. Beijing could favor proxy forces, standoff attacks, and a reliance on host nation militaries to bear the brunt of combat and minimize risks to PLA forces and prestigious high-end weaponry and plat-forms. The exception could be military operations against inferior opponents close to China’s borders, where the full might of the most advanced PLA capabilities could be brought to bear with a lower risk of disastrous losses.
对代理、对峙和间接战争方法的偏爱。对战争的道德主义强调，对平台的声望价值的夸大强调，以及以小规模精英部队为特征的分叉军队的现实，以及对较低级别部队战斗准备的不确定性，这些因素结合在一起，促使中国避免与美国联合部队进行象征性的直接交战，而选择非对称手段。中国可能倾向于代理部队、对峙攻击以及依靠东道国军队来承担战斗的主要任务，并将解放军部队和著名的高端武器装备和平台的风险降到最低。但对靠近中国边境的劣势对手的军事行动可能是个例外，在这种情况下，解放军最先进的能力可以发挥出来，而造成灾难性损失的风险较低。
Loosely coordinated war efforts with coalition partners. China’s aversion to alliances and lack of compelling security partners raise questions about its ability to build and lead international coalitions in support of Chinese interests. While the PLA has participated in multilateral missions such as United Nations peacekeeping operations, these have tended to avoid combat. A China that hopes to provide greater international leadership will be expected to provide more security goods for client states and will depend on client states to furnish access and, in some cases, military forces to support Chinese security efforts. To date, China has struggled to enlist countries to provide such access and support and has generally shown itself to lack international appeal. This may be due in part to the coun-try’s inexperience with international military leadership and a political agenda that seems centered on China’s revitalization, with other countries playing at most a secondary role. The fact that many of the countries lack a common agenda with one another outside Chi-nese patronage suggests that Beijing may not be able to build a robust, integrated coalition. Rather, China may settle for a loosely coordinated bilateral and occasionally multilateral security partnerships, which are more transactional and transitory in nature. Chinese dip-lomats could lean on one partner and then shift to another to carry out actions to include military attacks, acts of sabotage, or other hostile acts against U.S. interests. The piecemeal and disjointed nature of a pro-China coalition could result in a more unpredictable and poorly coordinated international effort, but it could be the best approach for China and its diverse network of partners, many of which have little motivation to support Chinese wars in other parts of the world.
与联盟伙伴松散地协调战争努力。中国对联盟的厌恶和缺乏令人信服的安全伙伴，使人们对其建立和领导国际联盟以支持中国利益的能力产生怀疑。虽然中国人民解放军参与了联合国维和行动等多边任务，但这些任务往往是避免战斗的。一个希望在国际上发挥更大领导作用的中国将被期望为客户国提供更多的安全产品，并依赖客户国提供通道，在某些情况下还需要军事力量来支持中国的安全努力。迄今为止，中国一直在努力争取各国提供这种机会和支持，并普遍表现出缺乏国际吸引力。这可能部分是由于中国在国际军事领导方面缺乏经验，而且其政治议程似乎以中国的振兴为中心，其他国家最多只能发挥次要作用。许多国家在中国的支持下缺乏共同的议程，这一事实表明中国可能无法建立一个强大的、一体化的联盟。相反，中国可能会满足于松散协调的双边和偶尔的多边安全伙伴关系，这些伙伴关系更多的是交易性的和过渡性的。
中国的外交官可以依靠一个伙伴，然后转向另一个伙伴开展行动，包括军事袭击、破坏行为或其他针对美国利益的敌对行为。亲中国联盟的零散性和不连贯性可能会导致更不可预测和协调性差的国际努力，但这可能是中国及其多样化的伙伴网络的最佳方法，其中许多伙伴没有什么动机支持中国在世界其他地区的战争。
In conclusion, a PLA confronting the specter of systemic war with the United States has strong incentives to modify aspects of its modernization program and operational meth-ods. However, the reality of sunk costs limits the ability of the PLA to dramatically modify the military it has already planned to build. China’s preparations for war would also be informed by key political imperatives.
总之，面对与美国系统性战争的阴影，解放军有强烈的动机来修改其现代化计划和作战方法的各个方面。然而，沉没成本的现实限制了解放军大幅修改其已计划建立的军队的能力。中国的战争准备工作也会受到关键的政治需要的影响。
In particular, the CCP’s goal of demonstrating China’s superiority, the reality of a two -tiered military with inconsistent doctrines and capabili-ties, and the inability to build a cohesive global alliance could profoundly shape the PLA’s preparations for conflict and how it manages combat operations outside China. The result could be a Chinese preference for waging indirect conflict through proxy forces, a focus on arming and backing client militaries, and a generally loose coalition of client states that may have little in common with each other beyond Chinese patronage and a general desire to redress historical grievances among developing countries.
特别是，中国共产党展示中国优势的目标，理论和能力不一致的两级军队的现实，以及无法建立一个有凝聚力的全球联盟，都会深刻地影响解放军对冲突的准备以及如何管理中国以外的作战行动。其结果可能是中国倾向于通过代理军队发动间接冲突，注重武装和支持客户军队，以及建立一个普遍松散的客户国家联盟，而这些国家除了中国的赞助和纠正发展中国家的历史怨恨的普遍愿望外，彼此之间可能没有什么共同之处。
Should war escalate into direct combat involving Chinese and U.S. forces, the PLA could favor standoff and automated weaponry as the preferred means of fighting. Despite Beijing’s incessant messaging about the PLA’s technological sophistication and superiority, the Chinese defense industries could find demand greatest for long-standing reliable weapons such as long-range missiles and unmanned combat systems.
如果战争升级为涉及中国和美国军队的直接战斗，解放军可能倾向于将对峙和自动化武器作为首选的战斗手段。尽管中国政府不断宣传解放军的技术先进性和优势，但中国国防工业会发现对长期可靠的武器如远程导弹和无人作战系统的需求最大。
