兰德智库《大国战争的回归——美中之间系统性冲突模式》 第二章（中英对照）

陶勇翻译 兰德智库《大国战争的回归——美中之间系统性冲突模式》 第二章（中英对照）

图片来源为网络，非报告原图。

CHAPTER TWOGeopolitical and Military Trends

第二章地缘政治和军事趋势

　　A starting point for analyzing potential U.S.-China systemic conflict is to describe such a strategic environment as well as we can. No one can know what the future holds, but we can perhaps narrow the range of possibilities by outlining some of the most plausible features. we focus on key geopolitical and military trends, as identified by both Chinese and Western analysts. In each section we describe a trend and consider some of its implica-tions for potential U.S.- China systemic conflict. As much as possible, we include both West-ern academic estimates that underpin each identified trend and Chinese sources that discuss similar trends. We then modify the analysis with assumptions to better accord with our focus on potential U.S.-China conflict scenarios.

　　通过分析美中系统性冲突“可能”的起点，我们认真描述这种战略环境。没人知道未来会怎么样，但我们也许可以通过分析一些最合理的特征来缩小“可能性”的范围。在本章中，我们将重点讨论中国和西方分析家所指出的关键地缘政治和军事趋势。在每一节中，我们描述一种趋势，并考虑其对潜在的中美系统性冲突的相关影响。我们尽可能地纳入已有定论的西方学术评估成果与中国方面学者对此研究的结论。最后，我们根据预设判断来更好呈现我们对潜在的美中冲突情景的聚焦。

Geopolitical Trends

地缘政治趋势

　　Several key geopolitical trends that are anticipated to endure for several decades could carry significant implications for scenarios of potential U.S.- China systemic conflict. These trends include the decline of the developed world and rise of the developing world; growing inter-national fragmentation and disorder; competition for resources and markets; the evolution of the global economy; the transition to multipolarity; and elevated risks from great power competition. For each trend, we consider evidence noted by Chinese and Western sources. We then explore the implications for our hypothetical scenario of U.S.-China conflict.

　　预计将持续数十年的几个关键地缘政治趋势可能对潜在的美中系统性冲突产生重大影响。这些趋势包括发达世界衰落和发展中世界崛起、日益严重的国家间分裂和混乱。对资源和市场的竞争、全球经济的演变、向多极化的过渡，以及大国竞争风险的上升。对于每一个趋势，我们都考虑了中国和西方研究的证据来源。然后，我们探讨了假设的美中冲突场景的将受到什么样的影响。

Shifting Global Balance of Power

全球力量平衡的位移

　　Chinese and Western scholars have noted broad international trends in global power that will likely shift away from the industrialized West, which has dominated world politics for much of modern history. The collective rise of the developing non-West and the shrinking share of global economic power of the West open the possibility that China could grow powerful enough to contend for global primacy. These broad trends also shape and constrain U.S. options for defending its international position. Looking only at the economic dimension of national power, a 2017 study by Pricewater-house Coopers asserts, for example, that by 2050 the developed nations in the Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) could see their share of world gross domestic product (GDP) fall to 20 percent, while those of an emerging seven” (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey) could exceed 50 percent of world GDP, adjusted for purchasing power parity. RAND researchers have highlighted similar possible geostrategic trends, including the polarization and retrenchment of the United States; a stronger China that is causing other states, particularly in Asia, to con-sider whether to bandwagon with or balance against China’s rise; a revanchist Russia; and a less united and weaker Europe.

　　中国和西方学者都注意到了全球权力位移的大概趋势，这些趋势可能会从西方工业化国家转移开来——西方工业国家在现代历史的大部分时间里一直主导着世界政治。发展中国家地集体崛起和西方国家在全球经济力量中所占份额的缩减，使中国有可能强大到足以争夺全球首要地位。这些大趋势也影响和限制了美国捍卫其国际地位的选择。

　　仅从国家权力的经济层面来看，例如，普华永道2017年的一项研究断言，到2050年，七国集团（加拿大、法国、德国、意大利、日本、英国和美国）中的发达国家可能看到它们在世界国内生产总值（GDP）份额下降到20%。而按购买力平价调整，那些新兴七国（巴西、中国、印度、印度尼西亚、墨西哥、俄罗斯和土耳其）可能超过世界GDP的50%。兰德公司的研究人员强调了类似可能的地缘战略趋势：美国国内政治的两极分化和全球战略收缩；一个更强大的中国崛起，以及一个不太团结和脆弱的欧洲和一个“特立独行”的俄罗斯——进而使其他国家、特别是亚洲国家需要考虑选择跟中国联合还是跟中国对抗。

　　Chinese scholars regard such trends as carrying tremendous historical significance. They acknowledge that the shift in global power from the developed world toward the develop-ing world could result in greater short-term international instability but could also unveil unprecedented opportunities for China in the long term. Chen Xiangyang, a professor at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, argues in a 2020 paper that strategic trends favoring the rise of China and the East and the “decline of the West” have “accelerated.” He notes the failure of Europe and the United States to solve many pressing global problems and underscores the reality of their waning power.

　　An article by the deputy dean of Renmin University’s School of International Studies, Fang Changping, has similarly judged that world politics and the global economy have “entered a new stage of flux.” He cites as key reasons the relative decline of American power and “rising populism and nationalism, the resurgence of strong-man and identity politics, and imbalanced economic development,” which, he asserts, have “eroded people’s identities and loyalties attached to the nation-state” and “intensified economic and geopolitical conflicts.”

　　Many Chinese scholars judge that the receding strength of the West provides an oppor-tunity for China to grow its influence with countries that are receptive to its model of gov-ernance and development. As Yang Jiemian, a scholar at the Shanghai Institutes for Inter-national Studies, observes, “There is a disconnect between countries’ commitments to the construction and reform of international mechanisms and their implementation. China hopes to be at the forefront of bridging this gap.” Yang notes that major non-Western countries have “increased their political awareness and self-confidence” and concludes that China’s “social-ism with Chinese characteristics” could appeal to countries that wish to accelerate develop-ment with a minimum of dependence on the United States.

　　Chinese scholars, according to several Western observers, generally appear increasingly hopeful about prospects for shaping the international order over the long term. In sum, this trend provides the fundamental basis for the possibility that China could near the point of contending directly for international leadership. Although far from certain and perhaps unlikely owing to China’s many weaknesses, the possibility cannot be ruled out. This sets up a key assumption of the scenario, which is that China has become strong enough that it is willing to risk conflict with the United States to secure its position as the top global power.

　　中国学者住处这些趋势具有巨大的历史意义。他们认为全球权力从发达国家向发展中国家的转移可能会导致短期内国际局势极不稳定，但从长远来看，也会为中国带来前所未有的机遇。中国现代国际关系研究院教授陈向阳在2020年的一篇论文中论证:有利于中国和东方崛起以及 “西方衰落”的战略趋势已经 “加速”。他指出欧洲和美国未能解决许多紧迫的全球问题，进而强调欧美力量减弱的现实。

　　中国人民大学国际关系学院副院长方长平的一篇文章也同样判断，世界政治和全球经济已经 “进入一个新的变化阶段”。他列举了美国实力的相对下降和民粹主义和民族主义的崛起，强人政治和身份政治的重新出现，以及不平衡的经济发展 作为关键原因，他断言，这些因素 “削弱了人们对民族国家的认同和忠诚”，并 “加剧了经济和地缘政治冲突 ”。

　　许多中国学者认为，西方力量的消退为中国提供了一个机会——对那些愿意接受中国发展模式的国家施加扩大影响。正如上海国际问题研究所学者杨洁勉所言：“各国对国际机制建设和改革的承诺与实施之间存在脱节。中国希望在弥合这一差距方面走在前列。” 杨洁勉指出，主要的非西方国家已经 “提高了他们的政治意识和自信”，并得出结论，中国的 “中国特色社会主义 ”可以吸引那些希望尽量不依赖美国加速发展的国家。

　　据一些西方观察家称，中国学者对长期塑造国际秩序的前景普遍抱有希望。总之，这一趋势为中国可能接近直接争夺国际领导权提供了基本依据。尽管还不确定，而且由于中国的许多弱点——也许不太可能——但不能排除这种可能性。这就为该设想提供了一个关键的假设，即中国已经强大到愿意冒着与美国冲突的风险来确保其作为全球第一大国的地位。

Increasing International Fragmentation and Disorder

国际分化与无序化地加剧

　　A symptom of an international system in transition away from a U.S.-led unipolarity is its increasing fragmentation and disorder, a trend recognized by both Chinese and West-ern analysts.The 2019 reportChina’s National Defense in the New Erastates that “global and regional security issues are on the increase.” It cites problems of eroding international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament efforts, the intensification of arms races in Asia and other regions, the spread of extremism and terrorism, and the increase in non-traditional security threats involving cybersecurity, biosecurity, and piracy.A report from the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence similarly anticipates a more uncertain and fractured international order and describes an evolving international order that features “uncertainty about the United States, an inward-looking West, and erosion of norms for con-flict prevention and human rights.”

　　Increasing international fragmentation poses both challenges and opportunities to China. Beijing has already had to confront the reality of internal breakdown in some of its partner countries. The PLA Navy sent a frigate to safeguard evacuees in Libya in 2011, and the PLA conducted a larger noncombatant evacuation operation in Yemen in 2015 for more than five hundred citizens of various countries. Chinese officials have had to grapple with persis-tent civil strife in key BRI partner countries such as Pakistan. Chinese articles have also pointed to the dangers posed by the Syrian civil war, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, unrest in Africa, and the Iran nuclear issue, all of which pose some level of threat to Chinese energy sources, markets, and natural resources.

　　国际体系从美国主导的单极化转型的趋势特征是日益分裂和无序，这是中国和西方分析家都承认的现实。“2019年中国新时代的国防 ”报告指出，“全球和区域安全问题正在增加。”报告列举了国际军控、防扩散和裁军努力受到侵蚀，亚洲和其他地区的军备竞赛加剧，极端主义和恐怖主义蔓延，以及涉及网络安全、生物安全和海盗行径的非传统安全威胁增加等问题。美国国家情报局局长办公室的一份报告也同样指出更加不确定和分裂的国际秩序，并描述了不断变化的国际秩序，其特点是 “对美国的不确定性、对内向的西方和预防冲突和人权规范的‘侵蚀’。”

　　日益加剧的国际分裂对中国来说既是挑战也是机遇。中国已经不得不面对一些伙伴国家内部崩溃的现实。2011年，解放军海军派出一艘护卫舰在利比亚保护撤离人员，2015年，解放军在也门为500多名各国公民进行了一次规模更大的非战斗人员撤离行动。中国官员不得不应对巴基斯坦等主要的一带一路伙伴国家持续不断的内乱。中国的文章还指出了叙利亚内战、巴以冲突、非洲动乱和伊朗核问题带来的危险，所有这些都对中国的能源、市场和自然资源构成了一定程度的威胁。

　　In the Asia-Pacific, Chinese analysts have argued that rising regional competition between China and the United States is likely to result in increased regional instability. To illustrate, scholars point out that China’s neighbors such as India and Japan attach importance to economic cooperation with China while simul-taneously deepening security ties to the United States. They also note that regional con-frontations, such as those involving North and South Korea, remain complex, featuring the involvement of several great powers and other regional powers. Chinese analysts also assess that regional hot spot issues remain contentious and that the risks of conflict in the India-Pakistan disputes and those regarding the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan may have increased.

　　But China, Russia, and others have also taken advantage of greater international disorder to secure gains. In 2022, Russia launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine. China and Russia in particular have successfully advanced their interests through measures short of war, also known asgray zone operations. A recent RAND report notes that adversary use of gray zone tactics through paramilitary forces and emerging military and communications technologies can destabilize states with increasing ease.

　　关于亚太地区，中国分析人士认为，中美之间不断加剧的地区竞争可能会导致不稳定。为了说明这一点，学者们指出，中国的邻国如印度和日本重视与中国的经济合作，同时又加深与美国的安全关系。他们还指出，区域对抗，如涉及南北朝鲜的对抗仍然很复杂，有几个大国和其他区域大国参与。中国分析家还评估说，地区热点问题仍有争议，印巴争端以及钓鱼岛区域和台湾问题的冲突风险可能增加。

　　但中国、俄罗斯和其他国家也利用更多的国际秩序混乱来获得利益。2022年，俄罗斯对乌克兰发动了大规模入侵。尤其是中国和俄罗斯通过战争之外的措施，也就是所谓的“灰色地带行动“，成功地推进了他们的利益合作。兰德公司最近的一份报告指出，对手通过准军事部队和新兴军事和通信技术使用灰色地带战术，可以越来越容易地破坏国家稳定。

　　The fragmentation of the international order shapes the future operational environment in which U.S.-China conflict might emerge. It creates greater uncertainty and therefore increases the risks of miscalculation. The exacerbation of long-standing security issues, the spread of diverse threats, and the weakness of global governance mechanisms raise the pros-pect that nontraditional and traditional threats could overlap and aggravate one another, a trend already well demonstrated in the case of Syria, where civil conflict, fueled by mass migra-tion owing in part to the effects of climate change, has intensified interstate feuding between Russia and the United States.

　　In the future, China’s deepening involvement with troubled states along BRI routes raises the possibility of conflict scenarios that arise, perhaps suddenly, from unexpected sources. Escalation in such volatile and confusing situations may become unpre-dictable. Tensions, crises, and conflict involving Chinese- and U.S.-backed forces could occur within the context of nontraditional threats and issues that complicate and aggravate conflict tendencies. In this analysis, the United States may need to find ways of responding to tradi-tional and nontraditional threats even as it manages a systemic conflict with China.

　　国际秩序的分裂形成了美中冲突可能出现的未来环境。它造成了更大的不确定性，因此增加了误判的风险。长期存在的安全问题恶化，各种威胁蔓延，以及全球治理机制的弱化，都提高了非传统威胁和传统威胁相互重叠和恶化的可能性，这种趋势已经在叙利亚的案例中得到了很好的证明，由于气候变化的影响，大规模移民加剧了叙利亚的国内冲突，加剧了俄罗斯和美国的国家间争斗。

　　今后，中国与 “一带一路 ”沿线问题国家关系日益加深，这就增加了冲突的可能性，这些冲突可能是突然发生的，来自意想不到的地方。在这种动荡和混乱的情况下，冲突的升级可能变得不可预测。涉及中国和美国分别支持的军事组织之紧张局势、危机和冲突可能发生在非传统威胁和问题的背景下，这些威胁和问题使冲突趋势复杂化和恶化。在这种分析中，美国可能需要找到应对传统和非传统威胁的方法，使其有助于管理与中国的系统性冲突。

Competition for Resources and Markets

对资源和市场的竞争

　　Another geopolitical trend that could affect conflict scenarios involving China and the United States concerns the competition for resources and markets. China’s ability to garner natural resources as its energy demand continues to grow could influence its military opera-tions abroad. According to a 2016 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) report, energy security will remain a major concern for most countries, with large resource deposits located in unstable regions of the world. The U.S. Energy Information Administration projects that global energy demand will increase 50 percent by 2050, with demand led by growth in Asia. This will likely result in competition for resources, which in turn will lead to instabilities in different regions, from the Arctic to the Middle East and from South America to the South China Sea.

　　In addition to energy, the increase in technical and electronic products requir-ing rare earth minerals has created another area of competition, such that countries willing to endure the high environmental costs of recovering them could manipulate access to the minerals for coercive purposes, as China has done in the past. Of the 33 minerals that the U.S. Department of the Interior listed in February 2018 as essential to the U.S. economy, China was the top producer of 19 and the top supplier of 12. Competition for energy is another trend that will likely persist for the foreseeable future. China currently imports oil and gas from more than 40 countries. In 2019 China imported approximately 10.1 million barrels per day of crude oil, which met approximately 77 per-cent of its needs, and China’s imports of natural gas could grow from 23.8 percent in 2021 to 46 percent by 2035.

　　另一个跟中国和美国冲突场景有关的地缘政治趋势乃对资源和市场的竞争。随着中国能源需求的持续增长，中国获得自然资源的能力可能会影响其海外军事行动。根据2016年北大西洋公约组织（NATO）的报告，能源安全仍将是大多数国家的主要关切，因为大量的资源矿藏位于世界不稳定地区。美国能源信息署预测，到2050年全球能源需求将增加50%，其中亚洲的需求增长居首。这可能会导致对资源的竞争——反过来又会导致不同地区的不稳定，从北极到中东，从南美到南海。

　　除了能源，信息技术进步和电子产品应用的扩展增大了稀土矿物需要，也创造了另一个竞争领域，这样，承受回收这些矿物之高环境成本的国家可以以胁迫性目的操纵获得这些矿物，就像中国过去做的那样。美国内政部2018年2月列出的对美国经济至关重要的33种矿物中，中国是19种矿物之最大生产国，12种矿物的最大供应国。而能源竞争更是在可预见未来持续存在的趋势。中国目前从40多个国家进口石油和天然气。2019年，中国每天进口约1010万桶原油，满足了约77%的需求，而中国的天然气进口可能从2021年的23.8%增长到2035年的46%。

　　Most of China’s oil and natural gas imports come primarily from Africa, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Russia. Beijing has become adept at intertwin-ing its search for diverse sources of energy to support its economic development with its desire to increase political and economic influence. The clearest example of this is the BRI, Xi Jinping’s ambitious project aimed at linking China to more than 60 countries across Asia, Africa, Europe, and Oceania through infrastructure projects, energy cooperation, and tech-nology deals. Through the BRI, China has increased overland oil supply via pipelines from Kazakhstan and Russia. In 2019 approximately 34 percent of China’s natural gas imports came from Turkmenistan via a pipeline that runs through Kazakhstan and Uzbeki-stan.

　　While China has sought to diversify energy suppliers and reduce dependency on stra-tegic choke points, it will continue to rely on sea lines of communication (SLOC) such as the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca for most of its hydrocarbon deliveries. The large volume of oil and natural gas imported from Africa and the Middle East will make securing strategic SLOC a priority for China for at least the next 15 years. In 2019, approximately 77 percent of China’s oil imports and 10 percent of its natural gas imports transited the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca.

　　中国的大部分石油和天然气进口主要来自非洲、中亚、波斯湾和俄罗斯。中国善于把寻找不同能源来源以支持其经济发展与提高政治和经济影响力相结合。最明显的例子就是 “一带一路”，这是习近平雄心勃勃的项目，旨在通过基础设施项目、能源合作和技术交易将中国与亚洲、非洲、欧洲和大洋洲60多个国家联系起来。通过一带一路，中国经由哈萨克斯坦和俄罗斯的石油管道增加了陆路供应。2019年，中国约34%的天然气进口来自土库曼斯坦，中国还通过一条穿越哈萨克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦的管道从土库曼斯坦进口石油。

　　虽然中国一直在寻求能源供应商的多样化，并减少对海峡咽喉的依赖，但目前还不得不继续通过海上交通线（Sea lines of communication）如南中国海和马六甲海峡来运送大部分的碳氢化合物。从非洲和中东进口的大量石油和天然气将使确保战略性Sea lines of communication成为中国至少未来15年的优先事项。2019年，中国约77%的石油进口和10%的天然气进口都经过南海和马六甲海峡。

　　China’s energy security interests extend to the Arctic region. China has invested in the Power of Siberia natural gas pipeline and financed the liquid national gas project in Yamal.This, combined with the opening of the Northern Sea Route, has provided the foundation for future energy cooperation between China and Russia. China’s Polar Silk Road, part of the BRI, is expected to serve as a vehicle for increased Sino-Russian investment and coopera-tion, in building Arctic infrastructure to support commercial transit and resource exploration along the Northern Sea Route.

　　Competition for natural resources and energy will likely persist even if China and the United States were to escalate their rivalry into conflict. Efforts to control access to vital resources could overlap and exacerbate related crises and wars, especially in countries hold-ing important energy reserves, such as those in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and possibly the Arctic regions. China’s desire to ensure secure supplies could conflict with demands by U.S. allies and partners for access to the same resources. The result could be mutually reinforcing sources of tension and fighting, which could add another layer of intrac-table conflict to a U.S.-China systemic war.

　　中国的能源安全利益延伸至北极地区。中国投资了 “西伯利亚之力 ”天然气管道，并为亚马尔的国家液态天然气项目提供资金。再加上北方海路的开通，为中俄两国未来的能源合作奠定了基础。中国的 “极地丝绸之路 “是 “一带一路 ”的一部分，预计将成为增加中俄投资和合作的工具。在建设北极基础设施以支持北海航道沿线的商业运输和资源勘探方面，中国也在努力。

　　即使中国和美国的竞争升级为冲突，对自然资源和能源的竞争也可能持续存在。控制重要资源使用权的努力可能会重叠并加剧相关的危机和战争，尤其是在拥有重要能源储备的国家，如非洲、中东、中亚，以及可能的北极地区。中国确保安全供应的愿望可能与美国的盟友和伙伴对获得相同资源的要求相冲突。其结果可能是相互加强的紧张和争斗的来源，这可能为美中系统性战争的另一个棘手冲突诱因。

China’s Growing Leadership in the Global Economy

中国在全球经济中日益增长的领导力

　　As has been noted, the evolution of the global economy is expected to feature the growing strength of developing countries and receding strength of the industrialized West. Experts have described how the world economy may rely more on China and developing countries for future growth. Chinese sources in particular have highlighted the importance of the BRI, the massive Chinese-led trade and investment infrastructure project connecting Africa, Eur-asia, and parts of Latin America. Both a Nineteenth Party Congress report and a 2019 foreign policy white paper promote a new version of globalization centered on the BRI. Although BRI projects have come under considerable criticism for their role in encouraging unsustain-able debt and other problems, most Western experts agree that the future evolution of the global economy will likely feature a larger role for emerging economies, many of which are BRI partners.

　　The World Bank estimates that implementation of major BRI projects could increase global trade by 1.7 to 6.2 percent and raise world incomes by 0.7 to 2.9 percent. But a world economy that features greater Chinese leadership could face its own challenges. China and other countries may need to commit military resources to help manage the secu-rity challenges posed by disorder and fragmentation in the developing world. Future growth also faces challenges from economy-related issues. The Nineteenth Party Congress report, for example, notes that the “gap between rich and poor countries continues to widen.” It also observes that global economic growth has remained slow. Western scholars have simi-larly highlighted trends toward imbalanced global economic development and inequality, slowing growth, a reduction in the economic interdependence that has traditionally served as a restraint on interstate violence, and weakened norms and international institutions.

　　正如人们所注意到的，全球经济的演变预计将以发展中国家的实力增长和西方工业化国家的实力消退为特征。专家们描述了世界经济如何在未来的增长中更加依赖中国和发展中国家。中国消息来源特别强调了一带一路的重要性，这是中国主导的连接非洲、欧亚和拉丁美洲部分地区的大规模贸易和投资基础设施项目。党的十九大报告和2019年外交政策白皮书都提倡以一带一路为中心的新版全球化。虽然一带一路项目在鼓励不可持续的债务和其他问题方面受到了大量批评，但大多数西方专家都认为，全球经济的未来发展可能会让新兴经济体发挥更大的作用，其中许多是一带一路的合作伙伴。

　　世界银行估计，实施主要的金砖倡议项目可以使全球贸易增长1.7%至6.2%，使世界收入增长0.7%至2.9%。但是，一个以中国为主导的世界经济可能会面临自身的挑战。中国和其他国家可能需要投入军事资源来帮助管理发展中世界的混乱和分裂所带来的安全挑战。未来的增长也面临着与经济有关的挑战。例如，党的十九大报告指出，“富国和穷国之间的差距继续扩大”。报告还指出，全球经济增长仍然缓慢。西方学者也同样强调了全球经济发展不平衡和不平等的趋势，增长放缓，传统上对国家间暴力起到抑制作用的经济相互依存度降低，以及约束机制和国际机构被削弱。

　　Although the global economy could experience deceleration and fragmentation, interna-tional commerce would still depend on vital SLOC and maritime trade routes. China’s over-seas trade will continue to depend on several major commercial shipping routes that pass by regions such as the Bay of Bengal, the North Sea, the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, and potentially the Arctic. China has long had concerns about the vulnerability of mari-time trade routes to piracy. The BRI’s Maritime Silk Road, which seeks to better connect China and open new trade routes through strategic access to global ports and waterways, will also create maritime vulnerabilities such as greater exposure to piracy and terrorism.The increasing importance of digital services and technologies means that infrastructure for information technology could also become a more important aspect of the global economy. As but one example of the increasing importance of the digital economy, China’s digital pay-ments accounted for 40 percent of the world total and were worth US $790 billion in 2016.

　　Although the future expansion of the digital economy is constrained by a large rural work-force that cannot be easily absorbed into the digital economy, cyberspace will likely remain important for China’s economic security. China’s role in leading the “new economic globalization” centered on BRI provides a strong incentive for its military to increase efforts to build military partnerships with clients. The PLA could increase operations to counter nontraditional threats and help build partner capacity in select countries in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, as well as along maritime routes through the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. The Arctic region could play a more important role in global commerce, raising the risk of militarization in that area. U.S. allies and partners may find themselves in disputes with Chinese client states, which could result in proxy conflicts between China and the United States. The overlap of resources and markets with BRI routes suggests that prospects for conflict could be higher in all these areas.

　　尽管全球经济可能经历减速和“分裂“，但国际商业仍将依赖至关重要的海上交通线和海上贸易路线。中国的海外贸易将继续依赖几条主要的商业航道，这些航道经过的地区包括孟加拉湾、北海、南海、马六甲海峡，以及潜在的北极地区。长期以来，中国一直担心海上贸易路线容易受到海盗的侵害。金砖国家的 “海上丝绸之路 “旨在通过对全球港口和水路的战略进入，更好地连接中国并开辟新的贸易路线，这也把海上运输线的脆弱性更多地暴露给海盗攻击和恐怖袭击。数字服务和技术的重要性日益增加，则意味着信息技术的基础设施可能成为全球经济的更重要方面。这只是说明数字经济日益重要的例子，中国的数字支付占世界总额的40%，2016年价值7900亿美元。

　　虽然数字经济的未来发展受到大量农村劳动力的制约，而这些劳动力不容易被数字经济所吸收，但网络空间对中国的经济安全可能仍然很重要。中国在领导以金砖国家为中心的 “新经济全球化 “中的作用，为其军方提供了强大的动力，使其加大与客户建立军事伙伴关系的力度。中国人民解放军可以在非洲、中东、南亚、东南亚以及印度洋和南中国海的海上航线上增加应对非传统威胁的行动，帮助合作伙伴建立能力。北极地区可能在全球商业中发挥更重要的作用，提高该地区军事化的风险。美国的盟友和伙伴可能会发现自己与中国的客户国发生争端，这可能导致中国和美国之间的代理冲突。资源和市场与金砖路线的重叠表明，在所有这些领域，冲突的前景可能会更大。

　　Shifts in International Partnerships

　　多级世界的形成

　　Although Western countries may, in general, see their collective share of world GDP decline while that of the developing world increases, major developed countries are expected to con-tinue to remain key players in the future world order. Both Chinese and Western sources agree that the world is moving away from a unipolar system dominated by the United States. However, they continue to debate what might come next. Chinese analysts anticipate the advent of an international system characterized by multipolarity. Fang Changping defines multipolarity as “power distributed more evenly among the major countries and an increased willingness on the part of major countries to act independently of the United States.” Chi-nese scholars and others perceive multipolarity as providing China more freedom to maneu-ver while decreasing vulnerability to hostile action by the United States.

　　Multipolarity is also viewed as one of the driving forces behind the reshaping of an international system that China views as primarily dominated by and benefiting the United States. As Yang Jiemian observes, “The multipolarization of international power has been a long-term, historical process of development that is only beginning to see the gradual balancing of international influence between the East and the West in sectors long dominated solely by Western powers, including economy, politics, science and technology, culture, education, and public opinion.” Western scholars have also noted the fragmenting of Western power and the increasing might of rising major powers around the world. Analysts no longer regard the prospect of a postunipolar world as implausible and instead debate the implications of a world characterized by bipolar-ity, multipolarity, or with “no hegemon.”

　　尽管西方国家在世界GDP中的份额总体上可能下降，而发展中国家份额会增加，但主要的发达国家预计将继续在未来的世界秩序中扮演关键角色。中国和西方消息来源都认为，世界正在脱离由美国主导的单极体系。然而，他们继续探讨接下来会发生什么。中国的分析家们预计，一个以多极化为特征的国际体系将出现。方昌平将多极化定义为 “权力在主要国家之间分配得更均匀，主要国家更愿意独立于美国行事。” 中国学者和其他人认为，多极化使中国在国际关系中“游刃有余”，同时减弱了美国针对中国的“敌对行动”。

　　多极化也被视为重塑国际关系的驱动力之一，中国认为原有世界格局主要由美国主导并受益。正如杨洁勉所观察到的，“国际力量的多极化是一个长期的、历史性的发展过程，在经济、政治、科技、文化、教育和舆论等长期以来仅由西方大国主导的领域，现在，东西方之间的国际影响力逐渐平衡，这才是开始。”西方学者也注意到西方力量的分化和世界各地崛起的大国日益强大。分析家们不再认为后单极世界的前景是不可思议的，而是对以两极化、多极化或 “无霸权 ”为特征的世界的影响进行辩论。

　　While Chinese scholars describe the benefits that their country receives from a trend toward multipolarity, they also appear to recognize the challenges it brings. Fang Changping notes that multipolarity creates uncertainties for China in the security environment, particu-larly relating to the U.S.-China bilateral relationship: Multipolarity is advancing global interconnectedness in ways that support China’s goals of “peace and development” but is also giving rise to several new issues of instability, including rising global inequality, regional hot spot issues, and nontraditional security threats. The uncertainties in the security environment and development issues result-ing from regional multipolarization make Sino-U.S. relations a primary factor in deter-mining the stability of China’s peripheral and overall external security environments. In this understanding of multipolarity, Europe and the United States may remain friendly with one another, but would operate autonomously rather than as close allies. Other rising powers in the developing world, such as Brazil, India, or South Africa, could also play increas-ingly important roles in international politics.

　　In short, some partnerships may grow weaker, while new ones may emerge for either China or the United States. This may result in a more dynamic and fluid set of international coalitions in a situation featuring intense U.S.-China rivalry and even conflict. Multipolarity could also allow China to expand its informal rela-tionships with countries outside the region, such as in Latin America. There are also risks that multipolar competition could become more destabilizing. One Chinese article notes that the United States is engaging in “technological and institutional innovation in pursuit of absolute military superiority,” while France, Germany, India, Japan, and the United Kingdom are rebal-ancing and optimizing the structure of their military forces. This, combined with advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and other military technologies, means that China’s military secu-rity is vulnerable to “technology surprise and a growing technological generation gap.”

　　尽管中国学者描述了他们的国家从多极化趋势中获得的好处，但他们似乎也认识到了它带来的挑战。方昌平指出，多极化给中国的安全环境带来了不确定性，特别是与中美双边关系有关。多极化正在以支持中国 “和平与发展 “目标的方式推进全球相互联系，但也引起了一些新的不稳定问题，包括全球不平等的加剧、区域热点问题和非传统安全威胁。安全环境的不确定性和区域多极化带来的发展问题使中美关系成为威慑中国周边和整体外部安全环境稳定的主要因素。在这种对多极化的理解中，欧洲和美国可能会保持友好关系，但会自主运作，而不是作为亲密盟友。发展中世界的其他崛起大国，如巴西、印度或南非，也可能在国际政治中发挥越来越重要的作用。

　　总之，一些伙伴关系可能会变弱，而中国或美国则可能出现新的伙伴（关系）。在中美激烈竞争甚至冲突的情况下，这可能会导致一系列更有活力和流动性的国际联盟。多极化也可能使中国扩大与本地区以外国家的非正式关系，如在拉丁美洲。多极化竞争也有可能变得更加不稳定。一篇中文文章指出，美国正在进行 “技术和制度创新，以追求绝对的军事优势”，而法国、德国、印度、日本和英国正在重新平衡和优化其军事力量的结构。这一点，再加上人工智能（AI）和其他军事技术的进步，意味着中国的军事安全很容易受到 “技术惊喜和日益扩大的技术代沟 “的影响。

　　In a multipolar world featuring a China nearing global primacy, China and Russia could become close partners. There has already been an increase in military cooperation between the Chinese and Russian armed forces over the past several years. In June 2019 the two nations upgraded their relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Chinese scholars generally anticipate that the bilateral relationship will grow even stronger. Over the next several decades, the two countries could expand the scope and scale of military exer-cises, increase joint air and naval patrols in the Indo-Pacific region and potentially in areas closer to Russia, and increase cooperation in sensitive defense fields such as strategic mis-sile defense, hypersonic technology, and nuclear submarine technology. Increased China-Russia cooperation could also seek to undermine arms control treaties, and this might accel-erate an arms race with the United States. If the U.S.- China competition were to turn hostile in the future, China and Russia could collaborate to support operations against the United States and its allies and partners along BRI routes. The two nations could be joined by others that have antagonistic relations with the United States, such as Iran and North Korea.

　　The shift toward a multipolar international order raises the prospect of a more change-able and unpredictable geopolitical contest in which coalitions shift and partnerships grow or recede in unexpected ways. In such a coalition, Russia could play an especially prominent role. The United States would likely retain friendly relations with powerful entities such as the European Union and Japan, although the degree of alignment may differ. China’s appeal as a patron state could grow under conditions in which it had neared global primacy, because it would be better positioned to provide benefits to other countries. A China enmeshed in a global rivalry with the United States would also be highly motivated to cultivate international support. Embattled governments around the world burdened with domestic difficulties or confronting bitter feuds with their own rival states could appeal to Chinese patronage for assistance.

　　A key factor that could determine the extent of China’s network of clients would be how much each country judged Chinese assistance to be more valuable and meaningful than what the United States could offer. This scenario assumes that U.S. power continues to experi-ence relative decline, to the point that its willingness or ability to furnish goods and benefits to its partners and allies had eroded considerably. In such a situation, some disillusioned U.S. allies and partners could decide to abandon their former patron in favor of a position of neutrality or even switch to a more lucrative Chinese patronage. Although countries might hope to remain neutral, autonomy could be difficult to sustain in the face of intense pres-sure from Beijing and Washington, both of which could be expected to demand some level of support in exchange for material benefits of any type. In many ways, this dynamic would simply replicate a historical pattern featuring an acutely polarized international system, such as occurred in the World Wars and between the United States and Soviet Union in the Cold War. The pattern goes back to the 1700s and 1800s in Europe, where many smaller states aligned themselves with powerful great powers partly in hopes of securing the benefits of patronage. Indeed, studies have found that a rapid expansion in the number of alliances and partnerships tends to precede wars among great

　　powers.

　　在以中国接近全球主导地位为特征的多极世界中，中国和俄罗斯可能成为密切的合作伙伴。在过去几年里，中国和俄罗斯武装部队之间的军事合作已经增加。2019年6月，中俄两国将两国关系提升为 “全面战略伙伴关系”，中国学者普遍预计，双边关系将进一步加强。在未来几十年里，两国可能会扩大军事演习的范围和规模，增加在印度洋——太平洋地区和可能靠近俄罗斯地区的联合空中和海上巡逻，并加强在战略导弹防御、高超音速技术和核潜艇技术等敏感国防领域的合作。中俄合作的加强也可能寻求破坏军控条约，这可能会加速与美国的军备竞赛。如果中美竞争在未来转为敌对状态，中国和俄罗斯可以合作支持针对美国及其盟友和合作伙伴在一带一路沿线的行动。与美国有敌对关系的其他国家，如伊朗和朝鲜也可能加入这两个国家阵线。

　　向多极国际秩序的转变带来了更加多变和不可预测的地缘政治竞争的前景，在这种竞争中，联盟会发生变化，伙伴关系会以意想不到的方式增长或消退。在这样一个联盟中，俄罗斯可能会扮演一个特别突出的角色。美国可能会保留与欧盟和日本等强大实体的友好关系，尽管结盟的程度可能不同。在接近全球主导地位的情况下，中国作为援助国的吸引力可能会增加，因为它将更有能力向其他国家提供利益。陷入与美国全球竞争中的中国也会有很大的动力来培养国际支持。世界各地被国内困难所困扰的政府，或与自己的对手国家发生激烈争斗的政府，都会呼吁中国给予援助。

　　决定中国客户网络范围的关键因素是，那些国家认为中国的援助比美国提供的援助更有价值和意义的程度。这种情况假设美国的实力继续相对下降，以至于它向其伙伴和盟国提供货物和利益的意愿或能力大大减弱。在这种情况下，一些心灰意冷的美国盟友和伙伴可能会决定放弃他们以前的赞助人，转而采取中立立场，甚至转而接受更有利可图的中国赞助。尽管各国可能希望保持中立，但面对来自北京和华盛顿的强大压力，自主权可能难以维持，因为北京和华盛顿都可能要求提供某种程度的支持以换取任何类型的物质利益。在许多方面，这种态势只是复制了一种历史模式，即以严重分化的国际体系为特征，如在世界大战和冷战中美国与苏联之间发生的情况。这种模式可以追溯到18世纪和19世纪的欧洲，当时许多小国与强大的大国结盟，部分是希望获得赞助的好处。事实上，研究发现，在大国之间的战争之前，联盟和伙伴关系的数量往往会迅速扩大。

Elevated Risks from Regional and Global Competition

区域和全球竞争带来地更多风险

　　A turn toward hostile rivalry (see Chapter Five) could result in a heightened risk of conflict at both the regional level and beyond. Currently, Chinese and Western scholars tend to regard the risk of war among the great powers as still relatively low. A 2017 RAND report assessed the prospect of war between China and the United States as unlikely, though the study did note an uptick in conflict risks. Similarly, a commentary by Chinese media outlet CGTN rejected as improbable the possibility of U.S.-China war, though it regarded some sort of proxy clash as slightly less unlikely. At the regional level China seeks more sway over its neighboring regions and promotes an order in which U.S. influence does not dominate.

　　Both countries have outlined competing visions for the Asia-Pacific’s emerging economic, politi-cal, and security order. They continue to face risks of a military crisis over flash points related to Taiwan and the East and South China Seas. Chinese leaders have denounced U.S. alli-ances and protested U.S. surveillance flights along Chinese borders, the U.S. Navy’s Freedom of Navigation Operations, and other activities. Feuding extends to the global level as well; for example, China and the United States have stepped up disputes regarding trade and technolo-gy. Since the 2010s, China has sought more significant revisions of global rules and norms, both alone and in conjunction with Russia. In June 2018 Xi identified “leading the reform of the global governance system with the concept of fairness and justice” as one of the ten priori-ties for China’s diplomacy. In our scenario of Chinese near global primacy, the changes in the relative balance of power between China and the United States and their structural differ-ences at both the regional and global levels are the most fundamental drivers of a systemic war.

　　转向敌对的竞争（见第五章）可能会导致区域层面和其他层面的冲突风险增加。目前，中国和西方学者倾向于认为大国之间的战争风险仍然相对较低。兰德智库2017年的一份报告评估说，中国和美国之间爆发战争的前景不大可能，尽管该研究确实注意到冲突风险在上升。同样地，中央电视台国际频道（中国国际电视台）的评论认为，中美战争的可能性不大，并且也认为某种代理人冲突的可能性教小。在地区层面上，中国寻求对其周边地区有更多的控制权，并推动建立非美国主导地位之秩序。

　　中美两国都对亚太地区的新兴经济、政治和安全秩序提出了不同的看法，在与台湾和东海及南海有关的热点问题上，中美两国继续面临着军事危机的风险。中国领导人谴责美国的盟友关系，抗议美国在中国边境的监视飞行、美国海军的航行自由行动以及其他活动。中美争斗也延伸到了全球层面；例如，中国和美国加强了贸易和技术方面争端。自2010年以来，中国一直在寻求对全球规则和规范进行更重大的修订——无论是单独修订还是与俄罗斯共同修订。2018年6月，习近平将 “以公平正义理念引领全球治理体系改革 ”列为中国外交的十大优先事项之一。在我们设想的中国接近全球第一的情况下，中国和美国之间的相对力量平衡的变化以及它们在区域和全球层面的结构性差异是系统性战争的最根本驱动力。

Implications

影响

　　These geopolitical trends provide the general outlines of the geopolitical environment within which a hostile U.S.-China rivalry might emerge. The future geopolitical situation could fea-ture a more unstable international environment in which countries compete more aggres-sively for energy and other resources. A stronger China in partnership with Russia and other developing countries could face off against the United States and its allies and partners. A China nearing global primacy could have far greater international military presence and a larger group of military partners than it does today. Pervasive feuding at the regional and global levels raises the risk that conflict between China and the United States could spread beyond the Indo-Pacific to other regions around the world and in global domains including cyberspace and information technology. Table 2.1 shows the implications of key geopolitical factors for potential conflict.

　　这些地缘政治趋势提供了地缘政治环境的总体轮廓，在这种环境中可能会出现敌对的美中竞争。未来的地缘政治局势可能会出现更加不稳定的国际环境，各国会越来越激烈地争夺能源和其他资源。一个更加强大的中国和俄罗斯与其他发展中国家合作，可能会跟美国及其盟友和伙伴发生对峙。一个接近全球首要地位的中国可能拥有比今天更大的国际军事存在和更多的军事伙伴。在地区和全球层面上普遍存在的争斗，使中国和美国之间的冲突有可能超越印度洋——太平洋地区，扩散到世界其他地区和全球领域，包括网络空间和信息技术。（这里有个图表，但译者认为图表表述内容重复，故略去。）

Military Trends

军事趋势

　　Complementing our understanding of the geopolitical trends, analysis of anticipated devel-opments in warfare could illuminate how China and the United States might fight under a situation of Chinese near primacy. These trends go beyond traditional comparisons of forces; instead they involve military changes that are expected in coming decades and that could profoundly shape U.S.-China confrontation and conflict. Thus, we review a protracted great power war, society as a domain of warfare, concealment and stealth, gray zone operations, outer space as a contested environment, and war from a distance. As much as possible, we include perspectives from both Chinese and Western sources.

　　为了补充我们对地缘政治趋势的理解，对战争预期发展的分析可以阐明中国和美国在中国几乎占全球主导地位的情况下将如何作战。这些趋势超越了传统的力量比较；相反，它们预计未来几十年内发生的军事变化，并可能深刻地塑造美中对抗和冲突。因此，我们回顾一场旷日持久的大国战争、作为战争领域的社会、隐蔽与隐形、“灰色地带行动”、作为有争议的外层空间环境以及远程攻击。我们尽可能地包括来自中国和西方的观点。

The Heightened Risk of a Protracted Great Power War

旷日持久的大国战争风险加剧

　　Some Western scholars argue that future conflicts between great powers would focus on waging a limited war, because seeking victory through unconstrained warfare would lead to catastrophic destruction. Conflict between great powers could thus be protracted. As used by these experts, the termprotracted warrefers to a form of conflict characterized by long duration and limited means and ends. Such a conflict would aim to avoid the escalatory risks

　　of direct conventional war in favor of indirect conflict that blurs the line between military and nonmilitary domains. The potential for a protracted great power war is further increased by other trends discussed in this chapter, including the intensification of geopolitical competi-tion, conflict over scarce resources, and the resort to measures other than war to achieve secu-rity goals.

　　One study from the Center for a New American Security concludes that for future conflicts, limited protracted wars could include “peacetime preparation that is likely to blur with protracted, sometimes domestic, internal security operations, peacekeeping and coun-terinsurgency or counterterror missions.” The study judges that “attacks will resemble raids” in that “armed forces will probably be deployed on the receipt of specific intelligence in highly mobile and exceptionally rapid operations.” These small-scale operations would address only local, immediate threats while leaving the broader struggle unresolved. This approach dif-fers from that of many previous great power conflicts, in which countries mobilized large numbers of troops and equipment to decide wars through major combat engagements.

　　Frederick Kagan has argued that protracted war increases the possibility that states will incorporate economic warfare into their strategies to exhaust the opponent and degrade their will to fight. His and other studies highlight the importance of economics in protracted war. Adversaries could seek to disrupt trade and logistics in the initial stages of conflict and could carry out blockade operations and commerce-raiding operations during the more advanced stages of conflict. Given the rise of global logistics chains and just-in-time inventory systems, even small disruptions in the velocity of trade could trigger large-scale economic challeng-es. Although the risk of protracted conflict remains low in general, China’s growing mili-tary capabilities, robust nuclear inventory, and economic clout increase the likelihood that any prospective U.S.-China conflict could resemble a protracted war, a possibility we explore in more detail in Chapter Six’s low-intensity conflict scenario.

　　一些西方学者认为，未来大国之间的冲突将“首选”有限战争，因为历史教训表明无限战争导致人类无法承受灾难性破坏后果（如一战、二战，译者注）。因此，大国之间的冲突可能是旷日持久的（如俄乌战争，译者注）。正如专家门所言，旷日持久的战争是指冲突形式、特点是持续时间长，手段和目的有限。这种冲突目的是避免直接的常规战争升级风险，而选择模糊军事和非军事领域之间的非直接冲突。本章所讨论的其他趋势进一步增加了发生长期之大国战争的可能性，包括地缘政治竞争的加剧，对稀缺资源争夺的冲突，以及诉诸战争以外的措施来实现安全目标。

　　“新美国安全中心”研究指出：对于未来的冲突，有限的持久战可能包括 “和平时期的准备工作与持久的、有时是国内的内部安全行动、维和和镇压叛乱或反恐任务相混淆”。研究报告判断，“攻击将类似于突袭”，因为 “武装力量可能会在收到具体情报后部署进行高度机动和特别迅速的行动”。这些小规模的行动将只解决局部的、直接的威胁，而不解决更广泛的问题。这种方法跟以前的许多大国冲突不同，在以前的大国冲突中，国家动员了大量的军队和装备，通过大规模交战来决定战争。

　　弗雷德里克-卡根认为，旷日持久的战争增加了国家把经济战纳入其战略的可能性（俄乌战争中的西方对俄制裁如是，译者注），以耗尽对手并削弱其战斗意志。弗雷德里克-卡根和其他学者的研究强调了经济学在持久战争中的重要性。敌人可以在冲突初期阶段寻求破坏贸易和物流，并在冲突的后期阶段开展封锁行动和商业掠夺行动。鉴于全球物流链和及时库存系统的兴起，即使是贸易速度的小幅中断也会引发大规模的经济挑战。虽然长期冲突的风险总体上较低，但中国不断增强的军事能力、强大的核库存和经济影响力增加了任何潜在的美中冲突类似于长期战争的可能性，我们在第六章的低强度冲突情景中会详细探讨这种可能性。

　　Chinese scholars acknowledge the possibility of a great power war between China and the United States but regard it as unlikely. While they do translate and discuss Western writ-ings on protracted war, they have tended to downplay its relevance for China. A search for the termprotracted waron Chinese academic study databases turns up a handful of recent articles that used the term in a metaphorical of sense long-term struggle. An article published in the military newspaperPLA Dailyinvokes Mao Zedong’s classic workProtracted Warto suggest that China must adopt a new development pattern and avoid playing by rules set by the United States to advantage itself.

　　Instead of seeing future war through the lens of pro-tracted war, Chinese military analysts tend to focus on four different kinds of conflicts that hey judge as more likely for the PLA: (1) a large-scale, high-intensity defensive war against a “hegemonic” country attempting to slow down or interrupt China’s rise; (2) a relatively large-scale, high-intensity anti-separatist war against Taiwan independence forces; (3) a medium- to small-scale and medium- to low-intensity conflict related to territorial disputes or Chinese near borders; or (4) small-scale, low-intensity operations intended to counter ter-rorist attacks, preserve stability, and/or preserve the regime.

　　The acknowledgment of large-scale, high-intensity war against the United States is striking, but such sources do not explore the possibility in any depth, perhaps owing to political sensitivities. Instead these sources tend to refer to war in a general, abstract sense, unmoored from specific scenarios involving U.S. forces. Reflecting this tendency, the experts tend to emphasize the technological dimen-sions of “future war,” such as AI and systems-of-systems warfare featuring information sys-tems, long-range precision strikes, and advanced technologies. They do not discuss how the PLA would use these against U.S. forces in specific scenarios, however.

　　中国学者即承认中美之间有可能发生大国战争，但又认为这种可能性不大。虽然他们确实翻译和讨论了西方关于持久战的著作，但他们倾向于淡化其与中国的相关性。在中国学术研究数据库中搜索 “持久战 ”一词，发现最近有几篇文章将该词用于隐喻长期斗争的意义。发表在军事报纸《解放军报》上的一篇文章引用了毛泽东的经典著作《论持久战》认为中国必须采取新的发展模式，避免按美国制定的规则行事，以获得自身的优势。（此处英文原文“Protracted War “有误，译为中文是《持久战》，显然外国军事学者对中国已故领袖毛泽东经典历史著作《论持久战》”道听途说“成《持久战》、英文即“Protracted War”，事实上，《论持久战》英文应为” On Persistent Warfare ”，译者注。）

　　中国的军事分析家们可能无法从亲历战争的视角来看待未来战争，而是倾向于关注四种不同类型的冲突，即他们认为解放军更有可能：(1) 对试图减缓或阻断中国崛起的 “霸权 ”国家进行大规模、高强度的防御性战争；(2) 对台独势力进行相对大规模、高强度的反分裂战争；(3) 与领土争端或中国近边界有关的中、小规模和中、低强度的冲突；或(4) 旨在打击恐怖袭击、维护稳定和/或维护政权的小规模、低强度行动。

　　承认对美国进行大规模、高强度的战争是引人注目的，但这些消息来源并没有深入探讨这种可能性，也许是由于政治上的敏感性。相反，这些消息来源倾向于在一般的、抽象的意义上提及战争，与涉及美国军队的具体情景无关。为了反映这种趋势，专家们倾向于强调 “未来战争 ”的技术层面，如人工智能和以信息系统、远程精确打击和先进技术为特征的系统战。然而，他们并没有讨论解放军将如何在特定情况下使用这些技术来对付美国军队。

Society as a Domain of Warfare

社会也是战争的范畴领域

　　Increasingly, warfare is no longer solely confined to the military. The intersection of multi-ple emerging technologies, from surveillance technologies to AI, algorithms, machine learn-ing, and virtual reality, is creating the potential for aggressors to disrupt and manipulate the information-based foundation of society. As a result, the barriers between military and civilian, and between peacetime and wartime endeavors and responsibilities, are blurring. The potential economic devastation that could accompany such war could deter adversaries from escalating to this level. If deterrence failed, conflict could be waged between and among networks, targeting and disrupting the whole of society, according to Western analysts.

　　As Robert Johnson, an Oxford University specialist in the changing character of warfare, observes, “Future forces will make use of stealth, systemically operating through communi-cations networks and through the exploitation of the vulnerabilities of society. They will use information warfare to spread fear and panic but also wage kinetic warfare on and among civilian populations. Their aim will be to destroy financial systems, infrastructure, and the willingness to sustain resistance.” China could also carry out information operations that target U.S. elections, political processes, and governmental institutions or that contribute to broader societal disruption and the shaping of U.S. public opinion.

　　Chinese military analysts have written about society as a domain of warfare since the mid-2000s. Indeed, the concept is embedded within the PLA’s operational idea of informa-tion dominance, which asserts that the side with the information advantage will win the war. The idea that cybertechnology and information operations can be used in wartime to target civilian infrastructure and shape an adversary’s societal thinking has been discussed in authoritative PLA sources since at least 2009.The PLA’s Three Warfares concept, a doctrine that calls for employing military assets to wage public opinion and psychological and legal warfare, illustrates the importance China places on seizing the information initiative and continuously shaping the narrative in both peacetime and wartime, including use of informa-tion operations and propaganda campaigns to degrade adversary decisionmaking and mobilize support for China’s objectives.

　　Developments consistent with this trend can already be observed in the activities of hack-ers, activists, and informal propagandists being employed by China or Russia as part of their disinformation campaigns and cyber activities against the U.S. government and busi-ness interests. Chinese export of surveillance technology around the globe further creates opportunity to disrupt information networks and collect data that can be used to shape information operations. As a result, any future conflict involving the PLA will almost cer-tainly not remain within the military domain. In addition to the geographic expansion of U.S.-China competition given the geopolitical patterns discussed in Chapter One, the com-petition, should it turn hostile, would likely broaden to include societal targets.

　　事实上，战争不再仅仅局限于军事领域：从监控技术到人工智能、算法、机器学习和虚拟现实等多种新兴技术的交叉，正在为侵略者创造破坏和操纵社会信息基础的潜力。因此，军事和民事之间的界限，以及和平时期与战时工作和责任之间的界限，正在变得模糊不清。伴随战争而来的潜在经济毁灭危险可以阻吓对手升级军事冲突。西方分析家认为，如果威慑失败，冲突就会在网络之间展开，以整个社会为破坏目标。

　　正如牛津大学研究战争性质变化的专家罗伯特-约翰逊所观察到的：”未来军队将利用隐蔽性，通过通信网络和利用社会的弱点进行系统运作。他们将利用信息战来传播恐惧和惊慌，但也会在平民中发动武力战争。他们的目标是摧毁金融系统、基础设施和持续抵抗的意志。”中国还可以开展针对美国选举、政治进程和政府机构的信息行动，或促进更广泛的社会破坏和影响美国公众舆论。

　　自21世纪中期以来，中国军事分析家们就把社会作为战争领域来研究。事实上，这一理念已经深入到解放军信息主导权作战思想中，该思想认为拥有信息优势的一方将赢得战争。至少从2009年起，解放军权威人士就开始讨论网络技术和信息行动可以在战时用来攻击民用基础设施并塑造对手的社会思维。解放军的 “三战 “概念，即要求利用军事资源发动舆论战、心理战和法律战的理论，说明了中国在和平时期和战争时期都非常重视掌握信息主动权和不断塑造叙事，包括利用信息行动和宣传活动来削弱对手的决策，并动员人们支持中国的目标。

　　在中国或俄罗斯雇佣的黑客、活动家和非正式宣传员活动中，已经可以看到与这一趋势相一致的发展，这些活动是他们针对美国政府和商业利益的虚假信息运动和网络活动的一部分。中国在全球范围内出口监控技术，进一步创造了破坏信息网络和收集数据的机会，它可以用来塑造信息行动。因此，任何涉及解放军的未来冲突几乎肯定不会停留在军事领域。除了第一章所讨论的地缘政治格局中美竞争的地理范围扩大之外，如果竞争变成了敌对，那么它很可能会扩大到包括社会目标。

Concealment, Stealth, and Proxy Wa r

隐匿、掩蔽和代理战争

　　Along with the information-based societal disruption and the challenges that related activi-ties present, future conflicts appear poised to rely more on concealment or stealth. Accord-ing to scholars who analyze patterns of conflict, methods of stealth and concealment include smaller organizations, as opposed to large armies, operating from other countries or attempt-ing to remain concealed within populations or remote terrain. They also include “war by proxy,” where smaller groups and proxy actors assert the right to wage war, equipped with significant combat power. A technology trend, the “miniaturization of combat power,” enables smaller and more effective weapon systems with increased explosive power that can be carried by individuals. As Robert Johnson has observed, “The deduction of this trend is that every city, port and province is a potential battlespace.” The increase in the number of private security contractors and private military companies participating in security on behalf of states with interests overseas further illustrates this trend. Smaller, more dispersed, and well-armed groups make the conduct of proxy warfare easier, with nonmilitary or para-military groups and individuals trained and equipped by both state and nonstate actors.

　　An illustration of this trend may be seen in China’s increasing reliance on the paramili-tary People’s Armed Police (PAP) to secure interests outside its borders, particularly in Cen-tral Asia and along the borders with such countries as Afghanistan and Tajikistan. China is also hiring private security companies, both foreign and Chinese, to protect overseas facto-ries and infrastructure projects in Africa and Central Asia. Furthermore, the use of proxy cybersecurity groups by China, including advanced persistent threat groups, many of which are contracted by the Chinese Ministry of State Security, is another means of concealment because these groups’ activities are often unattributable. These activities will continue and are even likely to increase as the U.S.-China competition tightens and China potentially expands its network of client states, particularly along the BRI.

　　伴随着以信息为基础的社会破坏和相关活动带来的挑战，未来的冲突似乎将更多地依赖于隐匿或掩蔽。根据冲突模式分析学者观点：采取隐匿或掩蔽方法是较小的军事组织，而不是大型军队，在其他国家进行秘密行动或尝试在人群中和偏远地区隐匿行踪。“代理战争”，即规模较小的军事组织和代理行为者宣称有权发动战争，并配备了大量的“战斗力量”。当前的技术发展趋势，即 “战斗力小型化”使得个人可以携带更小、更有效的武器系统，并增加了破坏力。正如罗伯特-约翰逊所指出的，“这一趋势的推论是每一个城市、港口和省份都具有潜在的战斗空间。”私营保安承包商和私营军事公司（比如俄罗斯瓦格纳军事集团，译者注）的数量增加，代表有海外利益的国家参与安保工作，进一步说明了这种趋势。更小的、更分散的、装备精良的团体使代理战争更容易进行，非军事或准军事团体和个人由国家或民间机构训练和装备。

　　这种趋势的一个例证是，中国越来越依赖准军事化的人民武装警察（武警部队）来保护其境外利益，特别是在中亚以及与阿富汗和塔吉克斯坦等国接壤的边境地区。中国也在雇用私营保安公司，以保护非洲和中亚的海外工厂和基础设施项目。此外，中国使用代理网络安全机构，应用技术先进的攻防手段，其中许多由中国国家安全部组织的——采取隐藏手段——因为这些机构的活动往往无法确定归属。随着中美竞争的加剧和中国有可能扩大其客户国网络、特别是沿着 “金砖倡议”路线继续进行相关活动并逐步增强力度。

Gray Zone Operations

“灰色地带行动”

　　The termgray zone operationsrefers to operations that seek to achieve military goals primarily through nonmilitary means or use coercion to achieve national objectives below the thresh-old of war. Gray zone activities involve contractor, paramilitary, and proxy forces to coerce adversaries without provoking a military conflict. They also include nonkinetic means such as information warfare, economic coercion, or cybersecurity activities. Gray zone operations have become more common since the early 2010s. They are cheaper than conventional forms of conflict and carry lower risk of escalation, yet have proven remarkably successful: Iran has used these tools to advance its interests in the Middle East, and Russia has used them in Eastern Europe. In addition, countries are gaining a larger gray zone “toolbox,” including capabilities in emerging technologies such as AI-enabled cyberlearning, machine learning, and unmanned vehicles that can coerce and intimidate without the presence of military forces. Though they are below the threshold of war, these operations can increase regional instability and the risk of escalation through miscalculation.

　　Gray zone operations have played a pivotal role in advancing China’s interests in the East and South China Seas, as they have been used to further strengthen Chinese administration of disputed waters, island features, and resources. They also serve to establish Chinese civil-ian and military maritime presence as normal in the hope that the United States, regional nations, and the broader international community will accept China’s presence in disputed areas and hence its claims to those areas. While gray zone operations have occurred mainly in the maritime domain, they may provide a model of how China could pursue gray zone tactics on land—for example, in border disputes with India, where China has deployed a combination of military and civilian presence near or in disputed territory; gray zone forces include the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia and the paramilitary Chinese Coast Guard (CCG). Chinese literature also discusses use of AI and cybertechnology to enhance and shape information operations, which are used in gray zone conflicts. Given the relative success of gray zone operations in the Indo-Pacific region, China and the PLA will likely rely on gray zone actions and capabilities in future U.S.-China competition to support China’s objectives in other parts of the world and should conflict erupt.

　　“灰色地带行动”主要指通过非军事手段来实现军事目标，或者使用胁迫手段来实现低于战争门槛的国家目标。”灰色地带行动“涉及承包商、准军事部队和代理军事组织，以胁迫对手而不挑起军事冲突。”灰色地带行动“还包括非军事手段，如信息战、经济胁迫或网络攻防。自2010年以来，”灰色地带行动“已变得更加普遍。它们比常规形式的冲突成本更低，升级的风险也更小，但已被证明非常成功：伊朗利用”灰色地带行动“来推进其在中东的利益——俄罗斯则在东欧如法炮制。此外，各国正在获得更大的灰色地带 “工具箱”，包括在新兴技术方面的开拓，如人工智能网络学习、机器学习和无人驾驶车辆，可以在没有军事力量存在的情况下进行胁迫和恐吓。尽管这些行动低于战争的门槛，但它们会增加地区不稳定和误判升级的风险。

　　“灰色地带行动”在推进中国在东海和南海的利益方面发挥了关键作用，因为它们被用来进一步加强中国对有争议水域、岛屿特征和资源的管理。这些行动也是为了确立中国在海上的正常民事和军事存在，借此谋求美国、地区国家和更广泛的国际社会能够接受中国在有争议地区的存在，从而接受其对这些地区的相关诉求。虽然”灰色地带行动“主要发生在海洋领域，但也为中国在陆地上采取灰色地带战术提供了示范。例如，在与印度的边界争端中，中国在争议领土附近或在争议领土上部署了军事和民事力量；灰色地带部队包括人民武装力量之海上民兵和准军事的中国海警（中国人民武装警察部队海警总队）。中国的文献还讨论了使用人工智能和网络技术来加强和制造信息行动，这在灰色地带的冲突中被使用。考虑到”灰色地带行动“在印度——太平洋地区的相对成功，中国和解放军在未来的中美竞争中可能会借助”灰色地带行动“和能力，以支持中国在世界其他地区的目标，并在冲突爆发时支持中国。

Cyberspace and Outer Space as Contested Environments

网络空间和外太空间乃新竞争领域

　　Scholars also point to cyberspace and outer space as contested environments in conflicts over the coming decades. China and the United States already contend with each other in the cyber domains, and both sides have also built cyber-military units to defend their interests. While the United States has been the dominant player for decades in outer space through investments in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and satellite capabilities, future U.S. dominance is threatened as China and Russia improve their counterspace ties (i.e., employment of weapons to degrade or destroy space assets). In addition, the private sector is increasingly exploiting outer space for commercial use, including launching micro-satellites for imagery and communications purposes. This provides opportunities for other countries, including China, to capitalize on commercial technology—such as navigation and surveillance—that will improve the PLA’s global operations.

　　China is actively investing in its military capabilities for outer space and cyberspace. The PLA has been modernizing its satellite communications infrastructure; space-based survey, mapping, and navigation systems; and an increasingly diverse range of space launch vehicles. China has a growing fleet of maritime surveillance satellites and dual-use oceanographic and hydrological satellites, as well as an expanding constellation of Beidou navigation satellites— all of which, Chinese scholars note, diminish China’s reliance on the U.S.-produced global positioning system. The Beidou constellation achieved global navigation coverage by 2020. These space-based capabilities are supported by infrastructure on the ground that ensures network connectivity, including spacecraft and space launch vehicle manufacture, launch, command and control, and data downlink.

　　To address the increased vulnerability of space-based capabilities to attack, the PLA has also been developing counterspace capabilities, including an antisatellite capability that it tested in 2007 and 2014. An additional concern noted by Western experts discussing outer space as a contested warfighting domain is that China’s missile capabilities are undergirded by space-based surveillance and sensors that can work with over-the-horizon radars and other air- or ship-based sensors to find targets. Therefore, any future conflict involving China in which long-range missiles or hypersonic weapons come into play would likely spread to outer space. For any future low-intensity or proxy conflicts between the United States and China, space-based and navigational capabilities obtained from China by countries along the BRI digital Silk Road would augment the PLA’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and navigational capabilities, as well as providing intelligence and data-gathering capabilities to Beijing. This would potentially extend China’s ability to conduct military operations or support proxy forces in a future U.S.-China conflict.

　　学者们同样指出，网络空间和外层空间是未来几十年冲突的争夺领域，中国和美国已经在网络领域相互竞争，双方还建立了网络军事单位来捍卫自己的利益。虽然美国通过投资情报、监视和侦察（简称ISR）以及卫星能力，几十年来一直是外层空间的主导者，但随着中国和俄罗斯改善其反ISR系统（使用武器降低或摧毁对方ISR效能），美国未来的主导地位受到威胁。此外，私营部门正越来越多地将外层空间用于商业用途（如马斯克的一系列太空计划之火箭、航天器和星链等，译者注），包括为图像和通信目的发射微型卫星。这为包括中国在内的其他国家提供了机会，以利用商业技术，如导航和监视——这会改善解放军的全球行动能力。

　　中国正积极投资于外太空和网络空间的军事能力提高。中国人民解放军一直在对卫星通信基础设施、天基侦查、测绘和导航系统以及日益多样化的空间运载工具进行现代化改造。中国拥有一支不断壮大的海洋监测卫星和海洋学和水文学（军民）两用卫星船队，以及一个不断扩大的北斗导航卫星系统——中国学者指出，所有这些都减少了中国对美国打造的全球定位系统（GPS）的依赖。北斗卫星系统在2020年之前实现了全球导航覆盖。这些天基能力得到了地面基础设施的支持，以确保网络连接，包括航天器和空间运载火箭的制造、发射、指挥和控制，以及数据空地传输。

　　为了解决天基设施越来越容易受到攻击的问题，解放军也一直在发展反空间技术，包括2007年和2014年测试的反卫星试验。西方专家在讨论外层空间作为一个有争议的作战领域时指出的另一个关切是，中国的导弹能力是以天基监视和传感器为基础的，可以与超视距雷达和其他空中或船上的传感器合作来寻找目标。因此，任何涉及中国的未来冲突，如果远程导弹或高超音速武器开始发挥作用，很可能会蔓延到外太空。对于美国和中国之间任何未来的低强度冲突或代理冲突，一带一路数字丝绸之路沿线国家从中国获得的天基和导航能力将增强解放军的指挥、控制、通信、计算机、情报、监视和侦察（即C4ISR系统）和导航能力，并向中国政府提供情报和数据收集能力，这可能扩大中国在未来美中冲突中开展军事行动或支持代理部队的能力。

Long-Range Precision-Guided Munitions

远程精确制导打击

　　Another military trend noted by experts is that developments in long-range precision strike and multiuse platforms enables countries to place forces at risk from vast distances. New generations of antimissile technology and semiautonomous vehicles have spurred develop-ments in multiuse platforms that are able to operate on land, sea, air, and electronically. These enable an aggressor to conduct military operations without having to deploy forces close in, and it also increases the costs of response to the targeted country. China has made efforts to exploit this military trend through the diffusion of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and highly accurate extended-range delivery systems, such as bal-listic and cruise missiles. These include hypersonic antiship cruise missiles, as well as a robust inventory of ballistic missiles, many of which can be adapted to use hypersonic war-heads.

　　The PLA also fields approximately 200–300 conventional medium-range ballistic missiles, which increase the range for precision strikes against land targets and naval ships operating out to and beyond the first island chain, and a series of nuclear and conventional intermediate-range ballistic missiles that are road-mobile and increase the capability for near-precision strike as far as the second island chain. Conceptually, PLA scholars discuss target-centric warfare as part of their operational systems concept, which uses precision strike capabilities and intelligent munitions to paralyze an enemy’s operational system while limiting nontarget collateral damage. Increased integration of PGMs and other long-range missiles into the PLA’s arsenal means that the Chinese military could feasibly target U.S. forces and sup-porting client states from afar should the U.S.-China competition turn violent. However, the vulnerability of space-based and airborne ISR systems to both kinetic and nonkinetic strikes could mitigate, to some extent, the effectiveness of long-range strike capabilities.

　　专家们注意到的另一个军事趋势是，远程精确打击和多用途平台的发展使各国能够在千里之外消灭敌人。新一代的反导技术和半自动飞行器激发了多用途平台的发展，这些平台能够在陆地、海洋、空中和电子上进行操作。这些都使交战双方能够进行军事行动，而不必在近处部署部队，同时也增加了被攻击国家的应对成本（比如俄乌战争，译者注）。中国通过发展精确制导弹药（简称PGM）和高度精确的远程运载系统，如弹道导弹和巡航导弹，并努力利用这一军事趋势。这些导弹包括高超音速反舰巡航导弹，以及强大的弹道导弹库存，其中许多导弹可被改装为高超音速弹头。

　　解放军还装备了大约200——300枚常规（陆基，译者注）中程弹道导弹，这些导弹可以对第一岛链内外的陆地目标和海军舰艇进行精确打击，解放军还有一系列移动式核导弹和常规中程弹道导弹，这些导弹可以在公路上移动（由导弹发射车运载、可机动发射，译者注），可以近乎精确地打击第二岛链目标。从概念上讲，解放军学者把以目标为中心的战争作为其作战系统概念的一部分来讨论，即利用精确打击能力和智能弹药来瘫痪敌人的作战系统，同时限制非目标的附带损害（精确打击可以避免伤及无辜，译者注）。将精确制导导弹和其他远程导弹进一步纳入解放军的武器库意味着如果中美竞争变得不可收拾，中国军队可以从远处瞄准美国军队和其支持的客户国家。然而，天基和机载情报、监视和侦察系统易遭动能和非动能打击的脆弱性在一定程度上也降低了远程打击能力。

Implications

含义

　　This section has examined future patterns of conflict and military developments that bear on the PLA’s approach to supporting Chinese primacy in the U.S.- China competition. These future patterns of conflict point to several common themes that are likely to affect such a competition. First, they will expand the competition, both geographically and into other domains, including outer space and society. Second, these developments point to a range of ways in which China can support proxy groups or client states through dispersion, conceal-ment and stealth, gray zone operations, and the use of cybertechnology and other emerging technologies to cause societal upheaval. These possible scenarios in turn potentially increase the possibility of low-intensity or proxy conflicts in a U.S.-China competition. Table 2.2 sum-marizes these military developments and their implications for potential U.S.-China conflict.

　　本节研究了未来冲突模式和军事发展趋势，这些模式对解放军在中美竞争中支持中国的主导地位有积极作用。这些未来冲突模式指出了几个可能会影响中美竞争的共同主题。首先，它们将在地理和其他领域（包括外太空和社会）扩大竞争。其次，中国可以通过分散、隐匿和掩蔽、”灰色地带行动“以及使用网络技术和其他新兴技术来支持代理机构组织或客户国家，从而引起社会动荡。预计的未来冲突模式和军事发展趋势反过来将会增加美中竞争发生中低强度冲突或代理冲突的可能。表2.2总结了这些军事发展及其对潜在美中冲突的影响（因为表二内容实际已经在正文中呈现故略去，译者注）。

Summary

摘要

　　This chapter has examined key geopolitical trends and patterns of conflict that are likely to affect the PLA’s support to Chinese primacy. Several implications arise from this discussion that will be discussed in the remainder of this report. First, the possibility of U.S.-China con-flict owes in large part to broad historical trends related to the changing balance of power between China and the United States. To date, both countries have ensured that the competi-tion remains peaceful. Although the current risk of conflict remains low, the possibility that tensions will escalate to hostilities cannot be fully discounted.

　　Second, the broad geopolitical drivers raise the possibility that should U.S.-China com-petition turn hostile, Chinese cooperation with Russia could become even closer. The rise of the East also points to the possibility that China will be able to broaden the competition to other geographic areas by expanding its network of supportive client states in the developing world—most likely along BRI routes. This in turn could increase the potential for military crises and incidents involving China and possibly the United States across a much broader geographic region than is the case today. China’s deepening energy dependence could also lead to an expansion of Chinese military presence in Africa and the Middle East, which could provide Beijing with military options should a U.S.-China conflict erupt.

　　The military trends discussed in this chapter carry important implications regarding the potential trajectory of U.S.-China conflict as well. The risks of escalation provide a strong incentive for the two great powers to resort to more indirect methods of fighting, including economic warfare, information operations, and cyberwarfare. The overlap of unsettled and disordered geographic regions with China’s pursuit of infrastructure development along the BRI, the competition for resources, and an emerging mode of war featuring the blurring of military and society in conflict and the involvement of nonuniformed forces raise the prospect of low-intensity proxy wars. Improvements in space-based capabilities could allow China to field forces farther away and bolster its confidence to carry out combat operations abroad. The long ranges of advanced PGMs and the advent of new technologies suggest con-flict could be waged at greater distances and also involve more dispersed forces.

　　本章研究了可能影响解放军支持中国主导地位的主要地缘政治趋势和冲突模式。本报告的其余部分将讨论这一主题所产生的几个论点。首先，美中冲突的可能性在很大程度上归因于与中国和美国之间权力平衡变化有关的广泛历史趋势。迄今为止，这两个国家都确保了这种竞争保持和平。虽然目前冲突的风险仍然很低，但不能完全排除紧张局势升级为敌对行动的可能性。

　　其次，广泛的地缘政治驱动因素提出了这样一种可能性：如果美中竞争变成敌对，中国与俄罗斯的合作可能会变得更加紧密。东方的崛起也表明，中国有可能通过扩大其在发展中世界的支持性客户端网络（互联网根服务器源自美国，所以，其他国家网络均为客户端应用——译者注），将竞争扩大到其他地理区域——很可能是沿着一带一路区域。这反过来又会增加涉及中国以及可能涉及美国的军事危机和事件的可能性，其地域范围比现在要广得多。中国对能源依赖的加深也可能导致中国在非洲和中东的军事存在的扩大，一旦美中冲突爆发，中国就会有军事选择可能。

　　本章讨论的军事趋势对美中冲突的潜在轨迹也有重要影响。冲突升级的风险为这两个大国提供了强大的动力，使其采用更间接的作战方式，包括经济战、信息战和网络战。不稳定和无序的地理区域与中国追求一带一路沿线基础设施发展的做法相重叠。争夺资源，以及一种新兴的战争模式，即在冲突中模糊了军队和社会以及非军警部队的参与，这些都提高了低强度代理战争的前景。天基能力的改进可以使中国在更远的地方部署部队，并增强其在国外开展作战行动的信心。先进的远射程杀伤性精确制导导弹和新技术的出现表明，冲突可以在更远的地方进行，并且涉及更分散的部队。

【文/陶勇 翻译，本文为作者向188金宝搏体育官网投稿】